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SUMMARY 
 
Since the start of the conflict in Syria, the determination of the conflict has 
changed and engaged the global community. There have been, and still are, sev-
eral opinions from both organisations and the media, on the conflict in Syria as 
well on the United Nations Security Council. The primarily responsibility for the 
Council is the maintenance of international peace and security. In the process, 
the permanent members of the Council have the right to veto resolutions. The 
fundamental purpose of the veto system is to prevent Security Council decisions 
to be taken against the will of one or more of the permanent members, as it might 
eventually lead to a confrontation between the permanent members or between 
the permanent member and the UN. In perspective to the situation in Syria, the 
Council have been criticised for several vetoed draft resolutions and therefore the 
question arises whether the veto system is still in the interest for international 
peace and security. The selected resolutions, draft and adopted, to be discussed 
in this thesis are concerning the conflict in Syria; thus, it is a contemporary ex-
ample of a conflict where resolutions and vetoes from the Security Council have 
been debated. 
 
This thesis proposes a legitimacy assessment of veto decisions from the Security 
Council. Previous research has discussed a legitimacy assessment of Security 
Council interventions and adopted resolution. Therefore, the aim of the discus-
sion of legitimacy in this thesis is to assess whether veto decisions are taken in 
the interest of international peace and security. International relations and inter-
national law have become intertwined research fields, thus, when discussing the 
Security Council, the political intentions and arguments overshadows the legal 
arguments. Hence, the relationship between law and politics have been explored 
and during the legitimacy assessment the political factor becomes a part of the 
discussion. For the assessment, I suggest two indicators of legitimacy to be con-
sulted and thus, establish if a veto decision is to be considered legitimate and if 
the decision undermines the purpose of international peace and security. The sup-
port and purpose for the suggested indicators are discussed together with the as-
sessment. Arguments against the legitimacy assessment are brought forward and 
discussed, with focus on the possible risk of abuse, the possibility of sanctions 
and international principles which must be respected. 
 
The conclusions from the legitimacy assessment indicates that some veto deci-
sions are legitimate since the presented arguments are supported with interna-
tional principles, one veto decision does not have legitimacy due the arguments 
presented by the permanent members are not sufficient compared to international 
peace and security and finally, one veto decision is in the grey zone due to the 
permanent member´s coalition with Syria. The outcome of the assessment shows 
that the veto right is a topic which needs further research; however, it is my con-
clusion that the present veto right increase the political discussion and overshad-
ows the legal arguments. Therefor there is an increasing risk for veto decisions 
to undermine international peace and security. 
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SAMMANFATTNING  
 
Sen konflikten i Syrien inleddes, har konflikten utvecklats i flera faser och enga-
gerat den globala politiken på olika plan. Kritik har riktats mot FN:s Säkerhetsråd 
från såväl media och internationella organisationer. Säkerhetsrådets primära an-
svar är att upprätthålla internationell fred och säkerhet. Under denna process, har 
de permanenta medlemmarna i Säkerhetsrådet en vetorätt vid röstning av före-
slagna resolutioner. Syftet med denna vetorätt är att hindra Säkerhetsrådet från 
att ta beslut emot en eller flera permanenta medlemmars vilja, eftersom det kan 
leda till konflikter mellan de permanenta medlemmarna eller mellan en av de 
permanenta medlemmarna och FN. Sett till konflikten i Syrien har Säkerhetsrådet 
kritiserats för flera veto beslut och frågan är då om vetosystemet fortfarande är i 
intresse för internationell fred och säkerhet. De resolutioner som kommer disku-
teras, förslag och antagna, är gällande konflikten i Syrien. Detta eftersom kon-
flikten är ett samtida exempel på när resolutioner och veton från Säkerhetsrådet 
har debatterats mycket. 
 
Denna uppsats förespråkar att införa ett legitimitetstests av vetobeslut från Sä-
kerhetsrådet. Tidigare forskning gällande legitimitetstest har gjorts av antagna 
resolutioner och ingripanden från Säkerhetsrådet. Därav är syftet med denna upp-
sats att granska de vetobeslut som stoppade föreslagna resolutioner samt om 
dessa beslut var i intresse för internationell fred och säkerhet. Forskningen inom 
folkrätt och internationella relationer har blivit mer sammankopplade, därav när 
en diskuterar Säkerhetsrådet hamnar de juridiska argumenten i skuggan av de 
politiska intentionerna och politiska argumenten. Gällande legitimitetstestet, har 
jag föreslagit två indikatorer för bedömningen av ett vetobesluts legitimitet. 
Dessa indikationer kommer även vara till hjälp för att bedöma om vetobeslutet 
försvagar syftet med världsfred och avvärja hot mot den internationella säker-
heten. Syftet med dessa indikatorer lyfts fram i samband med legitimitetstestet 
och argument emot ett legitimitetstest diskuteras med fokus på eventuellt miss-
bruk av testet, möjligheten till sanktioner och internationella principer som måste 
respekteras. 
 
Slutsatserna från legitimitetstestet visar att vissa vetobeslut är legitima eftersom 
de framförda argumenten för besluteten har stöd i enlighet med internationella 
principer, dock har ett vetobeslut inte legitimitet eftersom argumenten från de 
permanenta medlemmarna inte var tillräckliga i förhållande till internationell fred 
och säkerhet, samt bedöms ett vetobeslut vara i gråzonen, på grund av den per-
manenta medlemmens sammanslutning med Syrien. Resultatet från legitimitets-
testet visar att vetorätten är ett ämne som det måste forskas vidare inom, dock är 
det enligt min uppfattning att den nuvarande vetorätten sätter de juridiska argu-
menten i skuggan av de politiska diskussionerna. Därför finns det en risk att ett 
vetobeslut underminerar internationell fred och säkerhet. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
GGI  Global Government Institution 
 
ILC  International Law Commission 
 
ISSG  International Syria Support Group 
 
NGO  Non-Government Organisation 
 
OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
During the year of 2016, the ongoing conflict in Syria together with the United 
Nations Security Council1 continued to be in the media spotlight. The start of 
events happening in Syria, leading up to the present situation, was in March 2011 
and as of 2013 it has descended into a civil war.2 Since then the conflict has 
changed and engaged the global community. There have been, and still are, sev-
eral opinions from both organisations and the media, on the conflict in Syria as 
well on the Security Council.3 Since 2011 there have been seven draft resolutions 
concerning the civil war in Syria, that have not been passed by the Council. In 
2016 Human Rights Watch, together with other Civil Society Organisation´s,4 
sent in a global civil appeal to the United Nations.5 This appeal was followed by 
the vetoed draft resolution on 8 October 2016.6 The actions, or lack of actions, 
concerning the question of Syria from the Security Council has been debated by 
the media, CSO´s etc. Any decisions to act from the UN in a conflict are decided 
trough the Council. The suggested actions are presented through draft resolutions 
and must be approved by an affirmative vote of nine members including all the 
permanent members. A veto right is given to all the permanent members and one 
veto “kills” the draft resolution. The veto will be further discussed in section 
2.2.1.  
 
The global community is not the same as it was back then when the Charter of 
the United Nations was written, as it is today 2017.7 After the advanced courses 
in Use of Force in International Law and International Legal Structure, my inter-
est for the regulations and functions for the UN was intrigued during discussion 
about the veto system, as well as the matter of legitimacy in international law. 
Questions that lingered where in the line with: Is there a need to adapt or change 
the veto system? How is a veto legitimate in the interest of international peace 
and security? These are questions I want to engage the reader with; however, they 
are general but were kept in mind when writing this thesis, as well for inspiration 
for the research questions. In perspective to the mentioned question, the thesis 
will explore the discussion on legitimacy with the veto system and therefor, the 
UN Charter becomes a part of the discussion.  
 
As a law student with an interest for international law, it is difficult to sometimes 
grasp the fact that political differences might be the reason for ongoing conflicts. 
The civil war in Syria is a contemporary example of a conflict where resolutions 
                                                
1 Hereinafter the Security Council or the Council. 
2 Rodgers, L., Gritten, D., Offer, J. & Asare, P 2016. 
3 For example, references, Human Rights Watch, Uniting for Peace and BBC 2013. 
4 Hereinafter CSO´s. 
5 Human Rights Watch, Uniting for Peace. 
6 More about the UNSC Draft Res 846 (8 October 2016) UN Doc S/2016/846 in section 
3.2.5. 
7 Hereinafter the UN Charter. 
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and vetoes from the Security Council have been debated. The conclusions from 
this thesis might hopefully be applicable in the determination of future vetoes; 
however, since all conflicts are different in their own way and therefor maybe 
more applicable on a case-by-case basis. While writing this thesis, the conflict in 
Syria is still ongoing and the question of UN actions in the Syrian conflict is still 
unsettled. 
 
1.2 Purpose and Research Questions 
What will be discussed and examined in this thesis is specific vetoes in the light 
of Security Council resolutions, drafts and adopted, concerning the conflict in 
Syria. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if specific vetoes, in perspective 
to the mentioned resolutions, is a good mechanism for the present world, thus it 
is a mechanism adopted in 1945 and to do so, the main question for the thesis is: 
Is the veto system for the permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council still in the interest of international peace and security? 
 
To answer the main question, a few questions will act as guidelines for the thesis: 
- Can a veto undermine the purpose of international peace and security? How 
is the validity of the veto then determined? 
- If a veto is not in compliance with the purpose of the UN Charter, should 
the article concerning the veto be amended?  
- If an amendment of the Charter of the United Nations is possible, how can 
an amendment be made? 
 
The study in the thesis is based on specific resolutions, drafts and adopted, and 
the reasons for the selected resolutions is discussed in section 1.3. Through ana-
lysing the resolutions in the light of the UN Charter on the one hand, and the legal 
philosophical question of legitimacy on the other, the aim is to examine the legal 
status of the veto in the question of Syria. To answer the stated questions, the 
selected principles of the international legal system will be explored. The aim of 
the thesis is to connect the concept of legitimacy with veto decisions. 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
It is a challenge itself to write a new angle on the topic of the veto system in the 
Security Council. Therefor I have chosen to focus on the Syrian conflict. The 
conflict is still ongoing and in the last few months of 2016, two draft resolutions 
suggesting actions to be taken were declined due to a veto vote by permanent 
member of the Security Council. I will not discuss the history of the Syrian con-
flict in this thesis; however, I will acknowledge some of the events leading up to 
a given resolution. The focus will be on the content of the resolution and it will 
be considered if the use of the veto by one or several permanent members in the 
Security Council is in the interest of international peace and security. 
 
I will not examine sanctions and interventions ordered by the Security Council, 
nor the discussion of responsibility to protect. I have decided not to include hu-
man rights in the examination of the veto system and the resolutions. Since the 
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discussion will focus on resolutions concerning Syria, it is not farfetched to in-
clude a discussion on human rights about the events taking place in Syria. How-
ever, the purpose of the thesis is to examine the veto decisions and its legitimacy, 
not its relation to human rights. 
 
Since the chosen subject for the thesis has a political significance, one cannot 
deny those arguments. Therefor I have included a chapter with the focus on le-
gitimacy in international law, as well as the relationship between law and politics. 
This is to give the analysis, as well as the arguments, more depth. 
 
In this thesis, I suggest a legitimacy assessment of veto decision with the purpose 
to determine if a veto could not be legitimate. Due to the issue of length and scope 
of such an assessment, it is not to be developed further than the composition then 
the set of criteria; thus, not to be regarded as complete or exhaustive. The pre-
sented legitimacy assessment will not include an assessment on the legitimacy of 
governments nor the entire UN; however, since the veto system is integrated in 
one of the main functions of the Security Council, it is not avoidable to mention 
the UN. The concept of legitimacy for the UN will be briefly mentioned and not 
explored in depth. 
 
1.4 Terminology 
The main question of this graduate thesis mentions the term international peace 
and security; thus, it is of relevance to understand the purpose and meaning of 
the term. In article 1 of the UN Charter, the term `international peace and secu-
rity´ is used when describing the fundamental purpose of the UN. Peace or uni-
versal peace can be found separately throughout the Charter; however, nowhere 
is international security to be found used alone. The Preamble together with arti-
cles 1, 2 and 3 indicates that peace is to be defined more than absence of war.8 
The provisions in the Preamble and mentioned articles refers to an evolutionary 
development in a state of international relations, which is meant to lead to the 
weakening of issues likely to cause war. If one compares article 1 paragraph 2, 
which aims at strengthening peace through development of friendly relations 
among nations, to article 1 paragraph 3, which indicates that the function of the 
UN is to bring stabilisation of international relations to prevent the likelihood of 
war. There is a close relationship between international security and peace, even 
though the interpretation spectrum of peace is broad.9 
 
The term international security consists of both a subjective and an objective el-
ement. The term implies the right of every state to take advantage of any relevant 
support system when in need, but at the same time implying the legal obligation 
for every state to support such systems.10 International security can be achieved 
and promoted through policies or various measures, two of which are mentioned 
in the first paragraph of article 1, namely measures of collective security and 
                                                
8 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 1, 2012, p.110. 
9 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 1, 2012, p.110. 
10 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 1, 2012, p.111. 
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adjustment or settlement of international disputes.11 The reference to interna-
tional peace and security is to be understood as the overarching purpose of the 
UN, while the suppression of aggression only is referred as one objective to be 
achieved through measures of collective security. This entails that international 
peace and security may be endangered by not only act of aggressions, but also 
any other threat of to peace. Further on does it mean that the Security Council 
may direct measures against a state being the victim of aggression if and to the 
extent that the measure effectively preserves international peace and security.12 
 
When mentioning that the UN has political legitimacy in the thesis, my stand 
point is that an entity possesses political legitimacy if it is: “[…] morally justified 
in wielding political power, where to wield political power is to attempt to exer-
cise supremacy, within a jurisdiction, in the making, application, and enforce-
ment of laws.”13 To have political authority, an entity only has it if in addition to 
possessing political legitimacy, it has the right to be obeyed by those who are 
within the scope of its rules.14 
 
1.5 Methodology 
The legal dogmatic method is the most common methodology in law and the goal 
of the method is to interpret, and describe, the law in a systematic way in order 
to be able to reach an authoritative conclusion on what the law entails. The 
method´s boundaries are set by the authoritative legal sources, such as law, case 
law and doctrine. The method applies the sources of law to solve the question or 
issue at hand, by investigating what is established through law and how law can 
be applicable.15 
 
The legal dogmatic method is valuable when ascertaining what the law is for both 
domestic and international law; however, when using the method strictly the re-
sult is often a descriptive product.16 Criticism has been raised towards this 
method, stating that it fails to consider the social effects of law to the extent that 
it only examines what is deemed to be authoritative sources and does not consider 
how the law is applied. The method is often challenged by social science method, 
such as empirical method, as well as sociological methods where these methods 
try to interpret for example how the law works in practice.17 
 
Since the subject of the thesis is in a legal area where politics are a related factor 
to the discussion and for that cannot be excluded for a classic legal analysis, even 
though the primary focus is the legal issues of the veto system. Therefor in an 
added research value, it is necessary to engage with normative questions, thus 
                                                
11 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 1, 2012, p.112. 
12 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 1, 2012, p.112. 
13 Buchanan 2004, p.146. 
14 Buchanan 2004, p.147. 
15 Kleinman, J. 2013, p.21. 
16 Kleinman, J. 2013, p.25. 
17 Kleinman, J. 2013, p.28-29 & 40. 
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including a different perspective to the research. Regarding the research ques-
tions stated in section 1.2, there is in this sense a need for a discussion of what 
law ought to entail. It is assumed that such a normative discussion can be done 
within the legal dogmatic method, but then it is perhaps not as dogmatic research 
method as the name entails.18 Thus, in this thesis the legal dogmatic method is 
used, but the conclusion of the arguments relies on a theoretical basis. 
 
1.6 Theory 
Most international legal scholar are influenced by the positivist legal view and 
the legal positivism view rejects natural law hence it determines whether as rule 
is law not depending on some moral criteria; thus, rejecting the consideration that 
there is a natural mortality which establishes what law is. Since positivism is a 
view on what law is and not what it ought to be, it is neutral to whether moral 
reasoning can determine how the law should be. 19 The scholars of the inclusive 
positivism argues that morality does not have to, but could be, included in a test 
of validity; however, the exclusive positivists argues that a moral evaluation can-
not be part of the determination of legal validity. 
 
When exploring the possibility of what law ought to be, the sense of morality as 
an indicator in the determination is not farfetched. In order to adopt a theoretical 
approach including moral concerns, one must first define what the goal of inter-
national law is, in order to be able to suggest what the goal ought to be. Interna-
tional law, specifically when discussing it in the context of the UN, aims to main-
tain international peace and security. A normative legal theory with focus on the 
ought-questions would be best suited for the discussion on legitimacy of veto 
decisions in this thesis. 
 
Since the thesis explores the definitions of legitimacy, as well as politics and law, 
a legal philosophical approach is included in selected chapters of the thesis in 
order to adapt legal critical studies.20 Hence chapter three focuses on the legiti-
macy and politics, and chapter five explores the possibility of a legitimacy as-
sessment. The critic towards the legal dogmatic method has been that it only fo-
cuses on the normative system as it is and not what the result of the system is.21 
Therefor it is my opinion necessary to apply both a normative perspective on 
what the law ought to be, in combination with the legal philosopher scholar’s 
different approaches on legitimacy.  
 
1.7 Previous Research 
Due to the delimitations of this thesis and the purpose of focusing on the veto 
decisions form the Security Council, previous research has been limited. The the-
sis is not analysing the interventions or sanctions ordered by the Security Council 
– it focuses on the decision making, therefor on one step earlier in the process. 
                                                
18 Kleinman, J. 2013, p.26. 
19 Buchanan 2004, p.20-21. 
20 Gräns, M. 2013, p.426 
21 Kleinman, J. 2013, p.24. 
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The limitation of the thesis is concerning the presented draft resolutions that did 
not become adopted, thus previous critic and discussions on UN actions becomes 
more guiding material, but not perfect reference material. Both Buchanan22 and 
Klabbers and Piiparinen23 explores the concept of legitimacy with references to 
interventions and sanctions performed by the UN; however, the discussion is lim-
ited concerning the vetoes. Therefor it is in my opinion that this thesis is a starting 
point for the continued discussion on the legitimacy of veto decisions from the 
Security Council. 
 
1.8 Material 
In accordance with the legal dogmatic method, the materials used for this thesis 
are the authoritative sources of law. However, sources of international law are 
harder to identify, since there is an absence of an international organ with legis-
lative competence. Usually, the authoritative sources of international law are de-
termined with reference to article 38 paragraph 1 of the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.24 The listed sources in the article are international con-
ventions, international legal custom and general principles of law. In addition, 
subsidiary sources listed are judicial decisions and teachings by highly qualified 
publicists. 
 
The material is foremost based upon official UN documents for the examination 
of the UN and the veto system. I have chosen to use the provided material online 
at the United Nations website. In addition to being up to date and easily accessed, 
the organisation´s website is first hand source of protocols, resolutions and infor-
mation about the Security Council. The fourth chapter is an examination of rele-
vant draft and adopted resolutions within the scope of the thesis. To understand 
the resolutions, whether they were adopted or not, I have decided to include the 
meeting notes from the Security Council. This is to get an understanding of the 
reasoning from the members of the Security Council regarding the resolutions. 
However, it has been difficult to find material in addition to the meeting protocols 
on how and what the permanent member states argued concerning the resolu-
tions. 
 
In order to understand and outline the definition and discussion of legitimacy, as 
well as the relationship between politics and law, the subsidiary sources have 
been the main materials in addition to official UN documents. Hence, the discus-
sion explores definitions and legal discussion in international law. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 See Buchanan, A. 2004. 
23 See Klabbers, J. & Piiparinen, T. 2013. 
24 Hereinafter ICJ Statute. 
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1.9 Outline 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one is the introduction, chapter 
two is the UN chapter, chapter three is the legitimacy and politics discussion and 
chapter four is the resolutions chapter. Finally, chapter five presents the legiti-
macy assessment and chapter six provides with my final remarks. Each chapter, 
except chapters five and six due to their analytical approach, ends with a sum-
mary. The purpose of each summary is to give the reader a quick reminder of 
what have been discussed and it becomes easier for the reader to get an overview 
of the chapter when reading the introduction together with the summary of each 
chapter. 
 
Concerning the citation in the footnotes, the references are written as it states 
within the square brackets in the bibliography under each author. This makes it 
easier for the reader to find the correct reference in the bibliography chapter. 
However, when citing official UN documents, I have used the Oxford Standard 
for Citation of Legal Authorities method.25 The purpose of using a different 
method is to avoid citation of the wrong document, as well facilitate the search 
for the document.  
 
Chapter 2 outlines the relevant regulation from the UN concerning the Security 
Council and the veto system. In addition, the chapter examine the principles of 
the international legal system, hence their importance for the Security Council´s 
work. The purpose of the chapter is to give the readers the tools regulated in the 
UN Charter. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates on the different views on legitimacy, as well as the rela-
tionship between politics and international law. This chapter will set the founda-
tion for the analysis. This chapter is of a more legal philosophical character, as it 
discusses different views on legitimacy and politics. 
 
Chapter 4 is the main substantive chapter, as it presents the draft resolutions and 
the reasons for the permanent member´s usage of veto. Due to the density of all 
information, the chapter is more descriptive. Furthermore, the chapter discusses 
resolutions concerning the question of Syria, which have been adopted. This 
chapter presents the facts that are further analysed and discussed in the final chap-
ters. 
 
Chapter 5 explores the legitimacy assessment. In connection to chapter 3 reflect-
ing on legitimacy and politics, with the introduced information in chapter 4, this 
chapter will assess what a legitimacy assessment is, as well as how it ought to be 
conducted. The final part of the chapter presents a legitimacy assessment based 
on the resolutions from chapter 4. The structure of the chapter consists mainly of 
my observations and arguments. 
 
Chapter 6 provides my concluding remarks and conclusions. 
                                                
25 In short, OSCOLA method. 
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2 UN Regulation 
 
As presented in the first chapter, the purpose of this thesis is to examine the veto 
decisions in the Security Council and if they ate regulated in the interest of inter-
national peace and security. To answer the main question, this chapter will focus 
on the Security Council and foremost the UN Charter.26 The function of the chap-
ter is to present the UN regulations the reader needs to understand before going 
deeper into legitimacy and to comprehend chapter four concerning the UN regu-
lations, drafts and adopted. 
 
The first purpose of this chapter is to give the reader a brief overview of the UN 
Charter with focus on the possibility of amending the Charter. An examination 
of amending the Charter is to broaden the discussion of the veto system and bring 
forward the aspect of should or should not the Charter be changed? In addition 
to examine the regulation for amendments, the second purpose is to describe the 
function of the Security Council and defining what is international peace and 
security. This definition will be of importance later in the thesis analysis. The 
third and final purpose of the chapter is to discuss the principles of the interna-
tional legal system to understand the scope and limits of the UN Charter. 
 
2.1 The UN Charter and amendments 
The purpose and function of the United Nations is found in the UN Charter. The 
Charter is a multilateral treaty which outlines the rights and obligations of the 
member states, it is also the constitution of the UN, laying down its functions and 
prescribing limits.27 In order for the UN and their member states, to act in ac-
cordance with the purpose in article 1 paragraph 1 of the UN Charter concerning 
international peace and security, the member states shall according to article 2 
paragraph 2 of the UN Charter:”[…] in order to ensure to all of them the rights 
and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations 
assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.”28 The design of article 
1 of the Charter is to provide a guide for the conduct of the UN organs; however, 
the question remains if article 1 are meant to be legally binding? The place of the 
article in the Charter is in the line with being legally binding, although the word-
ing of the article is more appropriate for the political objectivities of the UN, 
rather than for legally binding obligations. Nor does the article indicate how po-
tential conflicts between the purposes should be resolved.29  
 
In addition, the UN may not intervene in matters essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.30 The UN system is based upon the sovereignty of states 
and the seven basic principles of international legal system helps one to interpret 
                                                
26 See section 1.2 Purpose and questions. 
27 Shaw, M.N. 2014, p.876. 
28 Article 2 paragraph 2, UN Charter. 
29 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 1, 2012, p.108-109. 
30 Article 2 paragraph 7, UN Charter. 
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the Charter.31 The principle sets out in a sense what the limits are of the Charter. 
This will be further examined in section 2.3. The mentioned information might 
seem repetitive, but it is worth mentioning as it is of importance to remember the 
limits and purposes of the UN when discussing the veto system further on in the 
thesis. 
 
The focus will not be on the entire charter, instead it will zoom in on the articles 
concerning the purpose of the UN and the regulations concerning amendments. 
Upon studying the text, one cannot notice that there are difficulties to amend of 
the Charter.32 There have previously only been three amendments to the Charter 
and those were driven by the near doubling of memberships of the United Na-
tions, due to several former colonies becoming independent.33  
 
The amendments of articles 23, 27 and 61 of the UN Charter came into force in 
1965 and concerned enlargement of membership of the Security Council. The 
amended article 27 of the UN Charter provides that decision taken by the Security 
Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine mem-
bers and on all other matters by an affirmative vote of nine members, including 
the concurring votes of the five permanent members.34 The other amendments 
have been regarding article 61 and 109 of the UN Charter. The first of the two 
articles mentioned concerns the Economic and Social Council, whereas the se-
cond of the two articles concerned the General Assembly. Since this thesis fo-
cuses on the Security Council, there will not be any further details of latter 
amendments. However, one can make the conclusion of facts about the amend-
ments, is that they have focused more on the membership of the UN and small 
changes for the Security Council´s functions and powers. Thus, the veto system 
has not been changed since the UN was created. Hence the question – should the 
veto system be changed if it is not in the interest of international peace and secu-
rity? 
 
According to the articles 108 and 109 of the Charter, any amendment requires 
inter alia consent of all the permanent members.35 The two articles sets out two 
different methods. Article 108 deals with ordinary amendment procedure aimed 
to change any single provision and does not require any special administrative 
arrangements.36 Article 109 refers to a revision of the Charter, i.e. a project in a 
larger scale to be prepared by a conference of member states especially convened 
for the change.37 Although the mechanisms in the stated articles are complicated 
in themselves, it becomes more difficult to amend changes of the UN Charter, 
                                                
31 See section 2.3 Principles of the International Legal System. 
32 Continues in section 2.1.2. 
33 Chesterman, S., Johnstone, I., Malone, D. & Franck, T.M. 2016, p.4. 
34 Charter of the United Nations, Introductory Note. 
35 Shaw, M.N. 2014, p.877. 
36 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 2, 2012, p.2202. 
37 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 2, 2012, p.2202. 
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due to the existence of the veto system.38 Amendments of the Charter will be-
come binding for all member states; however, they must have the consent of a 
qualified majority. In the first phase of an amendment, the proposed amendment 
must either consist of the adoption of a decision on an amendment by the General 
Assembly under article 108 or by a review conference under article 109. In the 
second phase, the proposed amendment must be ratified by two-thirds of the 
members of the Security Council. As it is not a procedural matter, all permanent 
members have their veto right and any proposed amendments can be blocked by 
a single permanent member.39 The Charter does not provide any simplified pro-
cedure to deal with minor amendments: therefore, must the formal amendment 
procedures.40 The obstacles to reform the UN Charter, can be listed by various 
interests: rivalries among developing countries, or should there be more or fever 
permanent members? How should the UN reflect the global community truth-
fully?41 
 
2.2 The United Nations Security Council 
As the previous section of the chapter ended with hypothetical questions on the 
future of the UN, this part of the thesis will lay down the need-to-know 
knowledge about the Security Council and their functions, following by an ex-
amination on the veto system. 
 
The intention for the operation of the Security Council, was for it to be an effi-
cient executive organ with limited membership and function continuously.42 The 
Council consist of fifteen members of the United Nations, were five of them are 
permanent members. The permanent members are United States of America, 
United Kingdom, France, Russia and China. The other ten members are elected 
by the General Assembly on a two-year term43 and: “[…] in the first instance to 
the contribution of Members if the Unites Nations to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also 
to equitable geographical distribution.”44 
 
The mandate of the Security Council is not of a legal nature, as it interpretive 
powers are restricted to the maintenance of international peace and security.45 
For the interpretation of the UN Charter, one must acknowledge article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the law of treaties.46 Article 31 VCLT states that a treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith and in the light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty. The function and powers of the Security Council are regulated through 
                                                
38 The veto system will be discussed in section 2.2.1. 
39 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 2, 2012, p.2203. 
40 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 2, 2012, p.2202. 
41 Aust, A. 2010, p.204. 
42 Shaw, M.N. 2014, p.877. 
43 Article 23 paragraph 2, UN Charter. 
44 Article 23 paragraph 1, UN Charter. 
45 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 1, 2012, p.93. 
46 Hereinafter VCLT. 
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articles 24, 25 and 28 of the UN Charter. Per article 24 paragraph 1 of the UN 
Charter, the Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, and are acting on behalf of the member states. The 
discharging of this duty, shall be carried out in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the UN laid down in the UN Charter.47 The Council is the only 
principal organ of the United Nations whose resolutions are binding for member 
states, meaning that states do not have the option of choosing which of the deci-
sions from the Council they will or will not accept and implement.48 In addition 
to resolutions, the Council makes pronouncements in statements by its president. 
These statements are better known as presidential statements and might have 
legal effects. The presidential statements are not provided for in the UN Charter 
or in the Council´s Provisional Rules of Procedure.49 
 
In article 24 of the UN Charter, it is stated that the primary responsibility of the 
Security Council is to maintain international peace and security. Most resolutions 
from the Security Council contains recommendations and are referred to Chapter 
VI resolutions, thus Chapter VI of the UN Charter cannot impose legally binding 
measures.50 Legally binding measures are those decisions taken in accordance 
with Chapter VII by the Council. Articles 25 and 48 of the UN Charter has the 
combined effect to place a legal obligation on all member states.51 However, be-
fore the Council can decide to impose a measure, article 39 of the UN Charter 
requires that there must first be determined if there is an existing threat to the 
peace, the breach of peace or act of aggression.52 The Council is not always con-
sistent in the drafting of resolutions, since any expression of an article 39 deter-
mination or the mentioning of Chapter VII are not always included in the resolu-
tion texts. Usually this can be inferred from the rest of the resolution, by a presi-
dential statement or from the circumstances that has determined the Council to 
act in accordance with Chapter VII.53 
 
By asserting the UN's responsibility to intervene, even in in-
ternal conflicts—where human rights and the humanitarian in-
terests of populations are severely affected—Council deci-
sions, arising from evolving interpretations of the Charter, 
                                                
47 Article 24 paragraph 2, UN Charter. 
48 Fasulo, L.M. 2015, p.55. 
49 Aust, A. 2010, p.194. 
50 Aust, A. 2010, p.195. 
51 Article 25, UN Charter: The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry 
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter. 
Article 48, UN Charter: 1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the 
Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may deter-
mine. 2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations di-
rectly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they 
are members. 
52 Article 39, UN Charter.  
53 Aust, A. 2010, p.196. 
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have deeply affected the meaning of sovereignty at the inter-
national level.54 
 
2.2.1 The veto system 
Each member of the Security Council has one vote.55 Depending on the matter, 
the permanent members of the Council has the right to use their veto. If the deci-
sion is regarding a procedural matter, then it must be made by an affirmative vote 
of nine members.56 On all other matters, decisions must be made by an affirma-
tive vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent mem-
bers. If decisions under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and in accordance with 
article 52 of the UN Charter, a party abstained from voting.57 The fundamental 
purpose of the veto system is to prevent Council decisions to be taken against the 
will of one or more of the permanent members, as it might eventually lead to a 
confrontation between the permanent members or between the permanent mem-
ber and the UN.58 
 
The creators of the UN Charter, conceived that China, France, the United King-
dom, the United States of America and the Russian Federation, would continue 
to have important roles in the maintenance of international peace and security, 
due to their key roles in the establishment of the UN. “They were granted the 
special status of Permanent Member States at the Security Council, along with a 
special voting power known as the “right to veto”.59 It was agreed by the drafters, 
that if any one of the five permanent members cast a negative vote in the Council, 
the resolution or decision would not be approved.60 Although, if a permanent 
member does not fully agree with a proposed resolution, but does not wish to cast 
a veto, it may choose to abstain, thus allowing the resolution to be adopted if it 
obtains the required number of favourable votes.61 
 
According to historical statistics, during the years 1946 to 1986, the number of 
resolutions adopted are 593; however, the veto was used 212 times. In the years 
between 1987 and 2005 there was an increase in adoption of resolutions (1010) 
and a decrease in the use of veto (38).62 “The post-Cold War era has been marked 
by the Council´s disposition to tackle more numerous and diverse conflicts than 
it had been able to earlier, when it was stymied by the plethora of vetoes (cast 
and threatened) by the permanent members.”63 Since 2006 until the end of 2016, 
                                                
54 Weiss, T.G. & Daws, S., 2009, p.133. 
55 Article 27 paragraph 1, UN Charter. 
56 Article 27 paragraph 2, UN Charter. 
57 Article 27 paragraph 3, UN Charter. 
58 Simma, B., Khan, D-E., Nolte, G. & Paulus, A., Vol. 1, 2012, p.913. 
59 UNSC, Voting System. 
60 UNSC, Voting System. 
61 Article 27 paragraph 2, UN Charter. 
62 Weiss, T.G. & Daws, S., 2009, p.121. 
63 Weiss, T.G. & Daws, S., 2009, p.121. 
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the veto has been used twenty-two times by the permanents member.64 
 
2.3 Principles of the International Legal System 
This section of the chapter will focus on the principle of non-intervention, the 
duty to co-operate and the principle of good faith, thus they are of relevance with 
the discussion of legitimacy and the veto system. Why the principles are of im-
portance for the thesis, is because they repeatedly occur as main arguments and 
stand points for permanent members of the Security Council when it concerns 
the question of Syria. Therefor it becomes of interest to the of answer why a 
permanent member uses the veto and furthermore, if a veto is in the interest of 
international peace and security.  
 
Furthermore, the principles are guidance for interpreting the UN Charter and in-
terlinks the understanding the arguments of the permanent members with the 
Charter.65 In addition, when interpreting the principles there is an interrelation-
ship between the stated principles that must be mentioned. In the general part at 
the end of the declaration, it says: “In their interpretation and application the 
above principles are interrelated and each principle should be constructed in the 
context of other principles.”66 The interpretation of the principles should include 
one another, but have chosen to highlight those of most relevance to the topic of 
the thesis and the arguments presented by the permanent members. 
 
The Declaration on Principles of International Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, was adopted by the General Assembly in 1970.67 The document is a 
statement of the fundamental principles which the international legal order is 
based on and sets out seven basic principles: the prohibition on the threat or use 
of force, the duty to settle disputes peacefully, the duty of non-intervention, the 
duty to co-operate, the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples, the principle of sovereign equality of states and the principle of good faith.68 
When discussing principles, it is of importance to distinguish principles and 
rules. A rule has an all-or-nothing character, whereas principles do not. Principles 
are reasons for reaching conclusion, factors weighing in favour or a decision.69 
 
The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic juris-
diction of any State, in accordance with the Charter,70 
 
The principle of non-intervention affirms the central right of each state to inde-
pendence and to self-determination, hence the state´s rights to freely choose its 
                                                
64 UN Veto List. 
65 Author´s reflection. 
66 Lowe, V. 2007, p.118. 
67 UNGA Res 25/2625 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. 
68 Lowe, V. 2007, p.100. 
69 Lowe, V. 2007, p.101. 
70 UNGA Res 25/2625 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. 
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political, economic, social and cultural system.71 The principle also reinforces 
the principle of the non-use of force, as well as has the role as a guarantee of the 
integrity of each state. Non-intervention affirms the basic principle that states 
should not meddle in other states internal affairs, apart from allowing interven-
tion in circumstances where essential interest of the intervening state is imper-
illed.72 But the question is, what circumstances allows the state to intervene? 
Some might argue it is a right to intervene with the purpose to assist the process 
of self-determination, to counteract intervention by another state or it is justified 
as exercise of self-defence by the intervening state.73 “[…] the broad principle 
of non-intervention is tolerable as long as States feel that the expectations to it 
are broad enough, or narrow enough, to be reasonable.”74 In the declaration on 
principles of the international legal order, it sets out that the principle on non-
intervention prescribes that no state has the right, directly or indirectly, to inter-
vene for any reason.75 In addition to the General Assembly resolution, the prin-
ciple is supports the purpose of the UN as an organisation based on the principle 
of sovereign equality.76 
 
The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accord-
ance with the Charter,77 
 
The principle of duty for the states to co-operate with other states, irrespective of 
differences in their political, economic and social systems, to maintain interna-
tional peace and security, as well as promote international economic stability and 
general welfare of nations.78 In the adopted resolution by the General Assem-
bly79, the declaration sets out the scope and purpose of the principles.  The mem-
ber states of the UN have the responsibility and duty, according to the resolution, 
to take joint and separate actions in co-operation with the UN.80 The principle of 
co-operation is expressed in article 1 paragraph 3 of the UN Charter and is a core 
value for the UN. The UN is constructed on political co-operation to protect and 
maintain international peace and security.81 
 
The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obliga-
tions assumed by them in accordance with the Charter,82 
 
The purpose of the good faith principle is to ensure that each state has the duty 
                                                
71 Lowe, V. 2007, p.105. 
72 Lowe, V. 2007, p.107. 
73 Lowe, V. 2007, p.108-109. 
74 Lowe, V. 2007, p.109. 
75 UNGA Res 25/2625 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. 
76 Article 2 paragraph 1, UN Charter. 
77 UNGA Res 25/2625 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. 
78 Lowe, V. 2007, p.110. 
79 UNGA Res 25/2625 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. 
80 UNGA Res 25/2625 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. 
81 Article 1 paragraph 2, UN Charter. 
82 UNGA Res 25/2625 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. 
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to fulfil the obligations assumed by it in accordance with the UN Charter, as well 
the recognised principles and ruled of international law.83 The principle has two 
aspects, and the first purpose is to underscore that in international law: “[…] 
literal interpretations and applications of legal instruments must not be allowed 
to defeat the evident intentions of those who made them.”84 The second purpose 
of the principle of good faith is to reinforce that states are bound by the law and 
by the treaty obligations that they assume.85 This reflect article 31 VCLT, which 
states that a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith and also is the guiding article 
for interpretation of the UN Charter. 
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has discussed the relevant regulations of the UN Charter with focus 
on the veto system. The function and powers of the Security Council are regu-
lated through articles 24, 25 and 28 of the UN Charter. Per article 24 paragraph 
1 of the UN Charter, the Council has the primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security, and are acting on behalf of the member 
states. However, before the Council can decide to impose a measure, article 39 
of the UN Charter requires that there must first be determined if there is an exist-
ing threat to the peace, the breach of peace or act of aggression. Article 27 of the 
UN Charter gives the right of the veto to the permanent members. The funda-
mental purpose of the veto system is to prevent Council decisions to be taken 
against the will of one or more of the permanent members, as it might eventually 
lead to a confrontation between the permanent members or between the perma-
nent member and the UN. Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter opens the possi-
bilities for any amendments and it requires inter alia consent of all the permanent 
members. The two different methods according to the articles are further dis-
cussed in section 2.1. 
 
In addition, the chapter have discussed the principles of the international legal 
system, thus they are of relevance with the discussion of legitimacy and veto 
decisions. The principles are of importance for the thesis, because they repeatedly 
occur as main arguments and stand points for permanent members of the Security 
Council when it concerns the question of Syria. Three of the principles were ex-
plored. The principle of non-intervention affirms the central right of each state to 
independence and to self-determination. The principle of duty for the states to 
co-operate with other states, irrespective of differences in their political systems, 
in order to maintain international peace and security. The purpose of the good 
faith principle is to ensure that each state has the duty to fulfil the obligations 
assumed by it in accordance with the UN Charter, as well the recognised princi-
ples and ruled of international law. In conclusion, this chapter have fulfilled the 
purpose of outlining the legal framework for the thesis, thus, highlighted the im-
portant articles and principles to be familiar with before continuing the discussion 
on legitimacy and the veto decisions. 
                                                
83 UNGA Res 25/2625 (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/RES/25/2625. 
84 Lowe, V. 2007, p.117. 
85 Lowe, V. 2007, p.118. 
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3 Defining legitimacy and politics with law 
 
Following from the previous chapter, where the UN Charter and the veto system 
were examined, this chapter focuses on the matter of legitimacy and the relation-
ship between law and politics. The procedures within the UN is a dance between 
law and politics; however, to understand and question the veto system, the matter 
of legitimacy must be examined. This chapter will therefore be of a more legal 
philosophical angle, as the definition of legitimacy depends on which legal phi-
losopher one reads. This will benefit the discussion further on in the thesis, as the 
main question is to examine if the veto is in interest of international peace and 
security. As indicated before, the politics of law cannot be excluded from the 
examination of international law. So why write a chapter focusing on legitimacy? 
“Legitimacy matters in the real world because it affects power, and power mat-
ters because it creates the ability – on some views, is just the ability – to get 
things done.”86 
 
To include a brief discussion of politics in law will help to understand the dis-
cussion of Security Council regulations, adopted and drafted, in chapter four. To 
analyse if a veto decision is in the interest of international peace and security, one 
must question and discuss of the decision is legitimate. Thus, the purpose of this 
chapter of the thesis is to examine the relation between legitimacy and law, as 
well shed light on the issue of politics and international law. The first part of the 
chapter will discuss the matter of legitimacy and international law. The second 
part focuses on the relationship between international law and politics. 
 
3.1 Legitimacy 
When discussing legitimacy, one must distinguish between the descriptive and 
normative senses of the concept. As there are differences between scholars con-
cerning legitimacy, it is of importance to be able to distinguish the differences 
between the descriptive and normative senses. The descriptive view of legitimacy 
is that a norm or international arrangement is legitimate, if it finds approval by 
the subjects of the norm. For a norm or arrangement, legitimacy is created if the 
subjects believe that the norm or international arrangement believes to be legiti-
mate.87 The normative view of legitimacy examines whether the belief is correct, 
i.e. if the norm or arrangement satisfies certain specified conditions. The norma-
tive sense of legitimacy refers to a set of standards by which a norm or interna-
tional arrangement must fulfil to be considered legitimate.88 In a normative sense, 
an institution is legitimate if it has the right to rule and it includes promulgating 
rules and attempts to secure compliance with them.89 In accordance with the pre-
viously discussion on theory for this thesis, further discussion on legitimacy in 
                                                
86 Meyer, L.H. 2009, p.1-2. 
87 Meyer, L.H. 2009, p.2. 
88 Meyer, L.H. 2009, p.2. 
89 Meyer, L.H. 2009, p.29. 
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this section of the chapter will be in reflection to a normative theory.90 To con-
tinue a discussion in line with the descriptive sense would potentially reflect the 
analysis of this thesis and have a descriptive outcome, as well as limit the discus-
sion on what the law ought to be. 
 
However, the definition and examination on legitimacy might differ depending 
on the author. According to the legal scholar Thomas Franck the definition of 
legitimacy is:  
 
[…] a property of a rule or a rule-making institution which 
itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed nor-
matively because those addressed believe that the rule or in-
stitution has come into being and operates in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of right process.91  
 
In his opinion for a rule to be legitimate, a rule must communicate what conduct 
is permitted and what is not permitted.92 In a positivist argument, legitimacy can 
be defined as norms that have been accepted through procedure, which have been 
justified on their own and these procedures accepted as whole by the community. 
According to Franck, one cannot assume international law is legitimate, based on 
the belief that international law is created by state consent. International law is a 
result of negotiations and politics; however, the assumption of consent is not far 
from the truth. From a legal philosophical point of view:  
 
The creation of legal legitimacy is best explained as compris-
ing three elements. First, states and other international actors 
must build up shared understandings of what they want to ac-
complish through law, and of specific candidate norms. Se-
cond, international actors must work to ensure that the specific 
criteria of legality are met. Third, shared understanding and 
rules that adhere to the criteria of legality must be reinforced 
through a continuing practice of legality.93 
 
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope argues that legitimacy has a key role in ex-
plaining the influences of international law because legitimacy is a belief system 
for rules to be fair, it must be rooted in a framework of formal requirements. 
What defines the formal requirements are the inclusion of how rules are made, 
interpreted and applied in the framework.94  
 
If the legal rule is not grounded in shared understandings and 
if the criteria of legality are only weakly or imperfectly met, 
                                                
90 See section 1.6. 
91 Franck, T. 1990, p.24. 
92 Franck, T.M. 1988, p.716. 
93 Brunnée, J. & Toope, S.J. 2010, p.55. 
94 Brunnée, J. & Toope, S.J. 2010, p.52. 
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the rule will not generate fidelity, and it will not be employed 
in the reasoning of states as to appropriate behaviour.95 
 
A calibrated rule with the purpose to reflect complex considerations, embodying 
a textured system of regulatory and exculpatory principles, may suffer legitimacy 
because it invites disputes as to its applicability in any given situation or case.96 
According to Malcom N. Shaw, legitimacy can be understood in a broader way 
to the referring of the relationship with the international political system; thus, 
forming the link between power and the legal system. Hence, legitimacy links 
law and politics in a wider sense and depends upon the context it emerges. “Le-
gitimacy is important in that it constitutes a standard for the testing in the wider 
political environment of the relevance and acceptability of legal norms and prac-
tices.”97 For a moderate constructivist, legitimacy as a concept provides: “[…] 
an avenue to explore the normative dimension of politics which also implies an 
inquiry into the role law could play for a normative progress.”98 
 
3.1.1 The debate of consent 
When discussing the different views on legitimacy, the tradition of consent must 
be mentioned. Often when reading or discussing legitimacy, the aspect of consent 
is mentioned; however, there are two different interpretations of consent. The 
basic idea is that: “[…] the consent of persons within a state to the authority of 
the state that legitimates with respect to those persons.”99 The first interpretation 
of consent is hypothetical consent and the second interpretation is historical con-
sent. Criticism has been raised concerning both interpretation and according to 
David Hume, there might have been historical parties where they in special cir-
cumstances gave their consent; however, it does not follow that present parties 
are bound by historical consent. In addition, Hume further have argued that the 
idea of hypothetical parties and have given their consent to certain rules, does not 
bind parties in actual positions.100 Lukas H. Meyer argues that the tradition of 
consent can be unsatisfying when applied to an international context and espe-
cially when consent is considered as a sufficient condition for legitimacy.101  
 
The debate on the tradition of consent might be seen as non-decisive, but the 
problem of consent is real when discussing problems facing international legiti-
macy. Consent have an important role when discussing legitimacy; however, it 
is one part of the puzzle. Allen Buchanan describes consent in a positivist view 
according to international law as following. State consent is necessary for a norm 
to be legally valid in the international legal system and only when, and if, a norm 
is legally valid in the international legal system is it legitimate. As a result, only 
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when a norm enjoys state consent is it legitimate. Therefor a system of law is 
legitimate if the norms compromising the legal system are legitimate. The inter-
national legal system becomes legitimate only if the state consent norm is satis-
fied.102 Buchanan further explores why this line of argumentation is flawed since 
peremptory norms of international law applies to all states regardless to their 
consent to treaties or practices that contributed to their creation. In addition, cus-
tomary norms apply to states that did not consent to them. Therefor international 
law would become not legally binding because it does not enjoy state consent 
and the premise that state consent is necessary for a norm to be legally valid in 
international law can only be rejected.103  
 
3.1.2 Legitimacy of a forum 
When discussing the legitimacy of a forum, it can be tested in the same way as 
that of a rule: by reference to the determinacy of its charter, its pedigree, the 
coherence of its mandate and its adherence to the normative institutional hierar-
chy of international organisation.104 Global governance institutions105, such as 
the United Nations, are of importance as they create norms and information 
which enable member states, as well as other actors to coordinate behaviour in 
mutually beneficial ways.106 An institution ability to perform their purpose and 
functions, may depends on to whom it addresses their rules and whether others 
within the institution does not interfere with its functioning. Therefor allows le-
gitimacy actors to coordinate their support for institutions by appealing to their 
common capacity to be moved by moral reasons and not for purely strategic or 
exclusively self-interested reasons.107  
 
However, if an institution is based on reasons other than self-interest it might be 
considered more stable. Even though self-interest might change as circumstances 
changes, but moral commitments might be able to preserve the support for insti-
tutions. The question of legitimacy arises when there are moral disagreements on 
how the institution should be designed and function.108 To be able to reach an 
agreement on legitimacy and the changes, there must be sufficient consent con-
cerning the moral considerations that are relevant for the evaluation of alternative 
changes.109  It is not sufficient that only the international actors are justified, but 
also to whom the institutions rules addresses and that they have content-inde-
pendent reasons to comply with the rules, as well that the those within the insti-
tutions domain have content-dependent reasons to support the institution or at 
least not interfere with its function.110 To have content-independent reason to 
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comply with a rule is: “[…] if one has reasons to comply regardless of any pos-
itive assessment of the content of that rule.”111 
 
3.1.3 A final remark on legitimacy 
The determination of what legitimacy is and how it correlates to international law 
is vastly debatable. If a is practice seen as illegal but legitimate it is most likely 
to be the core of a new rule or practice.112 Therefor it is important to include 
legitimacy in the discussion of the law that is and the law that ought to be. Klab-
bers and Piiparinen describes the element of legitimacy as adding something slip-
pery to a discussion, since on one hand legitimacy cannot be traced to any given 
normative order but potentially encompass them all. On the other hand, legiti-
macy is sometimes posited as the overarching normative order. As indicated by 
Klabbers and Piiparinen, legitimacy can derive from various factors and sources. 
A legal rule might come into accordance with the right procedure, yet have ille-
gitimate contents; thus, a behaviour of a legitimate entity may cause these entities 
to lose legitimacy.113 
 
3.2 The relationship between law and politics 
This part of the paper will briefly examine the relationship between law and pol-
itics. As the United Nations is an international institution where law and politics 
coexists closely to produce results, it is of importance to some extend explain the 
law and politics. However, the importance is not to discuss whether there is a 
right or wrong. The focus of this section is to give the reader an overview of the 
different approaches on how to grasp the relationship between law and politics. 
The research fields in international law and international relationships are be-
coming more intertwined, especially when it comes to the UN and it is therefore 
of importance how the different fields connect, as well as overlaps when exam-
ining the same topic. In addition, the different approaches to how to define and 
understand the relationship with law and politics, indicates that there might be 
different assumptions by the member states and therefor what the political func-
tion of the UN is.114 Hopefully this will give an understanding when discussing 
how the political aspect is intertwined in the legal discussion of the veto deci-
sions. 
 
I have decided to focus on three different approaches on the relationship between 
law and politics. The first approach is realism, which treats politics as a struggle 
for material power between states and law as either irrelevant or a reflection of 
the prevailing balance of power.115 World politics states considered as rational 
unitary actors who are principally concerned with the survival in an anarchic sys-
tem. The states constant pursuit of power is considered central in explaining the 
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behaviour of the states and the balance of power is regarded as a necessary con-
dition for international law.116 Realism treats law and politics separate. Law is 
seen as a function to the state and to serve the political purposes of the state. “By 
implication law is fundamentally political and in relations between states the 
content of international law is determined by dominant states and will not be 
upheld when it conflicts with their perceived political interests.”117 Due to this 
perspective between law and politics, realists are sceptical about law providing a 
viable path to international order. This perspective address the existing of a grow-
ing body of law nor how law constrains stronger states or how weaker states uses 
law to shape outcomes. The realism only consider law for the interest of the pow-
erful.118 
 
The second approach is rationalism and finds expression in the writings of ne-
oliberal institutionalists. Their approach defines politics as a strategic game, were 
egoistic states seek the possibility to maximise their interest within existing en-
vironmental constraints. When it comes to international law, the rationalist sees 
it as a set of functional rules promulgated to solve cooperation problems.119 How-
ever, they find that solutions for states interest are best found through cooperation 
and regards institutions as functional solutions for cooperation problems.120 The 
rationalists image of states strategical negotiation functions only looks at one as-
pect of the international law and misses the part of how international law could 
be the focal point when discussing the struggles of legitimate political agencies 
and actions.121 The view that politics are strategic and utility-maximising actions 
and law is only a set of regulatory rules, do not account for the obligatory force 
if international law, since states accept legal rules as binding even in the absence 
of centralised enforcement mechanisms.122 
 
The third and final approach is constructivist. They view politics is as a socially 
constitutive form of action and law is a as central to normative structures that 
condition the politics of legitimate statehood and rightful action.123 Constructiv-
ists view that structures shapes the behaviour of states and normative, as well as 
ideal structures are important as material structures. In addition, they argue that 
one need to understand a state social identity and how it conditions the states 
actions and interests.124 “[…] actors are in a constant dialogue with the prevail-
ing norms of legitimate agency that constitute role identities to define their senses 
of self.”125 The focus point of the constructivist thought is the concern for reasons 
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for actions, i.e. a reason can be both individual or collective motive with a justi-
ficatory claim. Thus, the constructivists focus not only on the logic of appropri-
ateness, but also the logic of argumentation in which the norms provide a com-
municative framework for actors to debate the issues of legitimacy, purposes etc. 
Within these ideas is the view that international politics are both a rule-governed 
and rule-constitutive form of reason and action.126 However, their view on poli-
tics is not very articulated and unclear on how social and legal norms differ, as 
well as on how they see the international legal system should be conceived.127 
 
It is not difficult to see that law is continuously in danger of 
lapsing into an apology for politics. Critics of any prevailing 
law regularly accuse it of having done just this. This is natural 
because just like politics, law is understood to exist for the pur-
suit of social goals and there is constant disagreement about 
the correct goals. The same is true of international law […].128 
 
As the quote above indicates that the two interests overlap more than one thinks, 
hence they are understood to pursuit a goal. In the context of the UN, the rela-
tionship between law and politics seem even more closer since law from the or-
ganisation is a result of political dialogues. The different fields of international 
relations and international law have become intertwined and slowly ending the 
view of them as separate.129 The international legal order shapes politics through 
the discourse of international autonomy, as well as language, practice and the 
multilateral legislation.130  
 
The discourse of politics is now replete with the language of 
law and legitimacy as much as realpolitik, lawyers are as cen-
tral to military campaigns as strategists, legal rights is as 
much a power resource as guns and money, and juridical sov-
ereignty, grounded in the legal norms of international society, 
is becoming a key determinant of state power.131 
 
International law is a living cell which evolves through argumentative reasons 
about the form of rules, what the rules prescribe or proscribe, what their jurisdic-
tion is, as well as how the new rules should relate to established rules and about 
whether a certain action or inaction is covered by a rule.132 Therefor it is not far 
reached that politics is a given factor in the line of reasoning of international law 
and the formation of rules.  
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In conclusion, the political factor is of importance when discussing the decisions 
taken by the Security Council, thus it becomes clear when reading the protocols 
from the meetings that the political arguments overshadows the legal reasoning. 
The legal document for the meetings is the proposed resolutions, but the argu-
mentation concerning if the resolution was adopted or not is of a political nature. 
Therefor it is importance to reflect on the possibility that member states might 
have different opinions regarding the relationship on law and politics, depending 
on which of the reviewed approaches.  
 
3.3 Summary 
The character of this chapter is partly normative theory and partly with a legal 
philosophical approach. This is due to the discussions of the determination of 
legitimacy and, politics and law; thus, the chapter explores different approaches 
to the different terms. First, the chapter approaches legitimacy and one must dis-
tinguish the differences between the descriptive and normative senses. The de-
scriptive view of legitimacy is that a norm or international arrangement is legiti-
mate, if it finds approval by the subjects of the norm. The normative view of 
legitimacy examines whether the belief is correct, i.e. if the norm or arrangement 
satisfies certain specified conditions. In accordance with the theory of this thesis 
discussed in section 1.6, the approach to legitimacy for the thesis is mainly the 
normative approach; however, it is difficult to define legitimacy with a fixed set 
of rules. Klabbers and Piiparinen describes the element of legitimacy as adding 
something slippery to a discussion, since on one hand legitimacy cannot be traced 
to any given normative order but potentially encompass them all. According to 
Shaw, legitimacy can be understood in a broader way to the referring of the rela-
tionship with the international political system; thus, forming the link between 
power and the legal system.  
 
The approach to state consent was briefly discussed. According to some scholars, 
state consent is necessary for a norm to be legally valid in the international legal 
system and only when, and if, a norm is legally valid in the international legal 
system is it legitimate. According to Buchanan, this line of argumentation is 
flawed since peremptory norms of international law applies to all states regard-
less to their consent to treaties or practices that contributed to their creation. As 
for legitimacy of GGI, it is not sufficient that only the international actors are 
justified, but also to whom the institutions rules address and that they have con-
tent-independent reasons to comply with the rules, as well that the those within 
the institutions domain have content-dependent reasons to support the institution 
or at least not interfere with its function. 
 
Secondly, the chapter explores the different approaches on the relationship be-
tween politics and law. The different approaches on how to define and understand 
the relationship with law and politics, indicates that there might be different as-
sumptions by the member states and therefor what the political function of the 
UN is. The first approach is realism, which treats politics as a struggle for mate-
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rial power between states and law as either irrelevant or a reflection of the pre-
vailing balance of power. Realism treats law and politics separate, where law is 
seen as a function to the state and to serve the political purposes of the state. The 
second approach is rationalism and finds expression in the writings of neoliberal 
institutionalists. Their approach defines politics as a strategic game, were egoistic 
states seek the possibility to maximise their interest within existing environmen-
tal constraints. When it comes to international law, the rationalist sees it as a set 
of functional rules promulgated to solve cooperation problems. The third and fi-
nal approach, constructivist, view politics as a socially constitutive form of action 
and law is a as central to normative structures that condition the politics of legit-
imate statehood and rightful action. The focus point of the constructivist thought 
is the concern for reasons for actions, i.e. a reason can be both individual or col-
lective motive with a justificatory claim. 
 
In conclusion, the chapter have discussed the different approached of legitimacy 
and hopefully, give the reader an understanding of the complicated debate of 
what legitimacy could and should be defined as. Adding legitimacy to the dis-
cussion opens the possibility to question the veto decisions whether they could 
undermine the purpose of international peace and security. This will be further 
explored in chapter five. The connection to the discussion on politics and law 
with legitimacy is not obviously clear; however, the discussion on politics brings 
a new nuance to the thesis. The differences on how to reflect on the relationship 
between politics and law, reflects the differences in the UN. It is of importance 
to have this in mind when exploring the differences of opinions from the perma-
nent members and the political language overshadows the legal language. 
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4 The Resolutions 
 
The previous two chapters have, among other things, examined the UN Charter, 
the veto system and discussed the matter of legitimacy, as well shed light on the 
different approaches between law and politics. These chapters have presented the 
legal tools needed for this thesis and this chapter will explore some of the deci-
sions taken by the Security Council concerning Syria. Compared to the previous 
two chapters, where chapter two sets the legal framework and chapter three is 
written with a legal philosophical approach, this chapter is the densest part of the 
thesis. The chapter examines the different veto decisions and the arguments from 
the permanent members on why they used their veto right. Furthermore, the chap-
ter presents a few selected adopted resolutions concerning the question on Syria. 
The arguments for why these resolutions, adopted and drafts, have been dis-
cussed in chapter one. The purpose of the chapter is to introduce the reader to the 
information that will be further assessed in chapter five. 
 
The chapter begins with the draft resolutions and the structure of section 4.1 is 
divided by the main arguments, hence connecting different draft resolutions with 
the same argumentation from the permanent members and similar resolution 
character. The final section 4.2 presents the selected adopted resolutions concern-
ing the question on Syria. This section follows the same theme as the previous 
and therefor divided into sections of resolutions with similar character. Com-
pared to section 4.1 where all draft resolutions are discussed, only a few selected 
adopted resolutions are discussed in 4.2. It is in my opinion that they represent 
the common thread of resolutions from the Security Council and will be further 
discussed in chapter six. 
 
4.1 When the veto is used 
On 3 August 2011, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement con-
demning the Syrian authorities and called for an immediate end to all violence.133 
The presidential statement followed the massacre in Hama, Syria. On 4 October 
2011, the first drafted resolution was submitted to the Security Council; however, 
during the voting one of the permanent members used their veto vote. Since 2011 
the veto has been used for several draft resolutions concerning the conflict in 
Syria on various aspects. This part of the thesis is to examine the draft resolutions 
in the light of the Syrian conflict, where the veto of the permanent members to 
the Security Council have been used and the reasons why the veto was used. 
 
4.1.1 International principles 
Previously mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the structure of the chapter 
will be according to the main arguments presented by the permanent members 
on why they used their veto. The principles of the international legal system were 
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examined in chapter two.134 This section of the chapter examines the draft reso-
lutions which had been vetoed based on international principles, but before pre-
senting the arguments there will be a short presentation of the draft resolutions. 
 
Draft resolutions 
The first drafted resolution concerning the situation in Syria was discussed on 4 
October 2011.  The draft resolution was based on the presidential statement from 
3 August 2011 and the draft had the purpose of being a unanimous response from 
the Council on the development in Syria.135 The drafted resolution stated, among 
other things, demands for the Syrian authorities immediately refrain from using 
cease force against civilians, that they cease violations of human rights and allow 
the full exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms by its own popula-
tion.136 It also stressed:  
 
” […] that the only solution to the current crisis in Syria is 
through an inclusive and Syrian-led political process with the 
aim of effectively addressing the legitimate aspirations and 
concerns of the population which will allow the full exercise of 
fundamental freedoms for its entire population […].”137  
 
In addition, the drafted resolution condemns the attack on diplomatic personnel 
and calls upon all states to exercise vigilance and restraint over direct or indirect 
supply, sale or transfer to Syria of arms and relates material.138 The Security 
Council´s intention is to review Syria´s implementation of the resolution and con-
sider the option of including measures under article 41 of the UN Charter.139 
 
The second draft resolution to not be adopted by the Security Council, was dis-
cussed on the 4 February 2012. In addition to the continued condemnation of the 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian authorities, 
the draft resolution focused on the League of Arab States actions taken since 
October 2011. On 2 November 2011, the League of Arab States had decided on 
an action plan with the aim to achieve a peaceful resolution on the situation in 
Syria. This was welcomed by the Security Council in the draft resolution.140 The 
drafted resolution demands the Syrian government:   
 
[…] in accordance with the Plan of Action of the League of 
Arab States of 2 November 2011 and its decision of 22 January 
2012, without delay: […] 
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(e) allow full and unhindered access and movement for all rel-
evant League of Arab States´ institutions and Arab and inter-
national media in all parts of Syria to determine the truth about 
the situation on the ground and monitor the incidents taking 
place; and 
(f) allow full and unhindered access to the League of Arab 
States´ observer mission;141 
 
The Security Council underscores their support to the League of Arab States in 
the draft resolution, stating the full support for the League of Arab States decision 
on 22 January 2012 to facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, 
plural political system.142 
 
Veto arguments 
Regarding the first draft resolution from October 2011, the Russian delegation 
argued that the rejected draft had the philosophy of confrontation and in the del-
egation opinion it is an unacceptable approach to threat of an ultimatum and sanc-
tions against the Syrian authorities. An approach of that nature contravenes the 
principle of a peaceful settlement, as well as the respect of the principle of the 
unity of the Syrian people.143 The Russian delegation continued to criticise the 
wording of the draft resolution since the proposed wording on non-acceptability 
for foreign military intervention were not considered.144  
 
In addition, the Russian delegation argued for their prepared draft resolution, to-
gether with the Chinese delegation, respected the international principles. Even 
though their resolution was not supported by the Council, but according to them, 
their focus was more on the respect for national sovereignty and territorial integ-
rity, as well as the principle of non-intervention.145 In their opinion, the purpose 
with a resolution concerning Syria should respect the principle of the unity of the 
Syrian people and to refrain from confrontation in addition to invite a compre-
hensive dialogue aimed at achieving civil peace and national agreement by re-
forming the socioeconomic and political life of the country.146  
 
The tone of the arguments presented by the Russian delegation tends to present 
the western politics as something negative, i.e. they structure arguments as us 
versus them. Although the Russian delegation do not entail what western politics 
are in their reference. According to the delegation, the basis of statements pre-
sented by western politicians: “[…] such an approach would could trigger a full-
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fledged conflict in Syria and destabilization in the region as whole”.147 Further-
more, the arguments from the delegation are structured as we-approach, i.e. what 
we will do and we convey our condolences. In addition to condemn the differ-
ences in politicians, the delegation continued by reminding the Security Council 
of the implemented resolutions concerning Libya.  
 
“For us, Members of the United Nations, including in terms of 
a precedent, it is very important to know how the resolution 
was implemented and how a Security Council resolution turned 
into its opposite. The demand for a quick ceasefire turned into 
a full-fledged civil war, the humanitarian, social, economic and 
military consequences of which transcend Libyan borders.”148 
 
According to the Russian delegation, the best way to end a crisis is to refuse to 
provoke a confrontation and to bring together all responsible members of the in-
ternational community to induce the parties for launching an inclusive intra-Syr-
ian political process.149 The Russian´s presented their continued work with dis-
cussions and political dialogues with the Syrian government in Damascus. How-
ever, dialogues with the opposition must be undertaken since they are concerned 
about their country and who have said that they do not want foreign interference 
in their internal affairs, as well as granting access to international media.150 
 
The Chinese delegation presented their arguments and it continued in line with 
the Russian, i.e. provide constructive assistance and respect Syria´s sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity. The delegation underscored that any future 
actions taken by the Security Council must depend whether it complies with the 
UN Charter and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states. 
The delegation believes that, under the current circumstances, sanctions or threat 
thereof does not help to resolve the question of Syria.151 Therefor China voted 
against the draft resolution. 
 
In conclusion concerning the first draft resolution, an action taken by the Security 
Council must be done in respect to the principles and purposes of the Charter.152 
Since this draft resolution was discussed in the beginning of the conflict and be-
fore the situation was categorised as a threat to international peace and security, 
the principles were valued much higher than implement measures under article 
41 of the Charter. 
 
Compared to the first draft resolution, the second draft resolution presented ar-
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guments for a unified support to the League of Arab States by the Security Coun-
cil. Again, Russia and China were the two permanent members voting against the 
resolution. The Russian delegation argued that the sponsors of the draft resolution 
did not take into account the proposed amendments to the effect that the Syrian 
opposition must distance itself from extremist groups, as well calling on states 
and all those with any relevant opportunity to use their influence as an opposition 
to stop those groups committing acts of violence.153 The delegation continued by 
stating that nor did the draft resolution take into account the withdrawal of Syrian 
armed forces from cities and there should be an end to attacks by armed groups 
on state institutions and neighbourhoods.154 In addition, the delegation criticised 
that there should have been an included support to more flexibility for interme-
diary efforts of the League of Arab States, hence they would increase the chances 
for a successful inclusive Syrian political process. 
 
The Chinese delegation defended their veto in the same line, as the draft resolu-
tion in 2011, thus continued to underscore the right to state sovereignty and the 
principles of international legal system. In their opinion it is reasonable for con-
tinued consultations; however, that the concerns brought forward by the Chinese 
representation were not considered in the draft resolution.155 
 
In conclusion, the Russian delegation argues that the gaps in the text concerning 
the extremist groups and flexibility for international efforts. However, Russia and 
China have been consistent with their stand point that the path to find a solution 
on the conflict is through political dialogues. The purpose of the support to the 
League of Arab States is to support their plan on finding a peaceful resolution to 
the conflict in Syria. Once more their support for the veto decisions are the prin-
ciples of the international legal system and the respect to states sovereignty, in-
dependence and territorial integrity. 
 
4.1.2 Chapter VII 
What Chapter VII decisions entails have been briefly discussed in section 2.2. 
Since a decision supported by the chapter VII are binding for all member states, 
any resolution with the purpose to adopt such decisions becomes more difficult 
to get the full approval by the permanent members. At least when it comes to the 
question of Syria and the difference of opinions on the Security Council strategy 
for the conflict. 
 
Draft resolutions 
On 21 March 2012, the Security Council released a presidential statement fol-
lowing the 6736th meeting of the Security Council expressing grave concerns on 
the conflict in Syria. In addition, the Security council welcomed the appointment 
of Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, 
Kofi Annan, followed by the General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 
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February 2012, as well as relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States.156 
The aim of the Joint Special Envoy is to bring an immediate end to all violence 
and human rights violations and facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a 
democratic and plural political system.  
 
The Security Council stated their support of the Joint Special Envoy ´s initial six-
point proposal, which was outlined by the Joint Special Envoy to the Security 
Council on 16 March 2012.157 The proposal included, among others, commitment 
to work with the Joint Special Envoy in an inclusive Syrian-led political process 
to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people, ensure 
timely provisions of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, 
and to ensure freedom of movement throughout the country for journalists and a 
non-discriminatory vis policy for them.158 On 5 April 2012, the Security Council 
released another presidential statement following the 6746th meeting of the Se-
curity Council. The Council noted that the Syrian government committed on 25 
March 2012, to implement the Joint Special Envoy´s six-point proposal.159  
 
In the light of the previous mentioned presidential statements by the Security 
Council, the submitted draft resolution on 19 July 2012 reaffirmed once more the 
strong commitment by the Council to the sovereignty, independence and territo-
rial integrity of Syria, as well as to the purposes and principles of the Charter.160 
The draft resolution reaffirmed the support to the Joint Special Envoy for the 
United Nations and the League of Arab States. It determined that the situation in 
Syria constitutes a threat to international peace and security.161 In accordance 
with Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council decided to take several actions. For 
example, renew the mandate of the United Nations Supervision Mission in 
Syria162 and decided that the Syrian authorities shall implement verifiably their 
commitments as stipulated in resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012).163 If the 
Syrian authorities does not comply with the stipulated demands within ten days, 
the Council shall impose measures under article 41 of the UN Charter.164 
 
The second draft resolution to be examined was discussed on the Security Coun-
cil meeting on 28 February 2017. The draft was written in accordance with ac-
tions under Chapter VII, as a reflection to the reports presented by the Organisa-
tion for the Prohibition of chemical Weapons165 which identified actors involved 
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in several cases of chemical weapons in Syria.166 The purpose of the draft reso-
lution was to act and response on the findings by the OPCW concerning the use 
of chemical weapons. The submitted draft was annexed with a list which desig-
nated twenty-one Syrian individuals, companies and organisations that would 
have been subject to proposed measures in the draft resolutions.167 The proposed 
sanctions included freezing of assets, bans on travel and embargoes on specific 
equipment and materials, such as chlorine and other components of chemical 
weapons.168 In resolution 2118 (2013), the Security Council decided that the 
Syria and all parties in Syria shall cooperate with OPCW.169 The draft resolution 
recalled that the decision taken by the Council in resolutions 2118 (2013) and 
2209 (2015) that in the event of non-compliance with resolution 2118 (2013), 
measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter should be imposed.170 
 
In addition, the draft resolution suggests the Council to establishes a committee 
with the purpose to designate other individuals, groups and entities to be subject 
to proposed measures, as well as establish guidelines as may be found necessary 
to facilitate the implementation of imposed measures in the draft resolution.171 
The draft resolution also requested the Secretary-General to create a group of up 
to six experts with the purpose to assist the committee in the carrying out its 
mandate, in addition to gather, examine and analyse information regarding im-
plementation of the sanction measures. The group of experts shall also make rec-
ommendations on actions that the Security Council, states or committee may con-
sider taking to improve implementation of measures.172 
 
Veto arguments 
Once more, the vote´s against the draft resolutions was made by Russia and 
China. The Russian delegation argued that the draft resolution on 19 July 2012 
did not stand a chance of being adopted. According to the delegation, they have 
been clear and consistently explaining that they cannot accept a document under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In their opinion, a resolution under Chapter VII 
would open a way for the pressure of sanctions and further on for external mili-
tary involvement in Syrian domestic affairs.173 The delegation went further on by 
stating that the western members of the Security Council denied such intension, 
but refused to exclude military interventions in the draft text as well as the west-
ern members have been pushing their own geopolitical intentions, which does 
not have common interests with the Syrian people.174 The delegation stressed that 
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the draft resolution did not represent the present state in Syria and that it runs 
counter to the spirit of the Geneva document. 
 
The Chinese delegation argued that the text contradicts the aims of consensus 
among Security Council members. First, according to the delegation the draft 
resolution is flawed and unbalanced, as it seeks to put pressure on only one party. 
 
It would not only further aggravate the turmoil, but also cause 
it to spread to other countries of the region, undermine re-
gional peace and stability, and ultimately harm the interests of 
the people of Syria and other regional countries.175 
 
Secondly, the draft resolution would erode international trust and cooperation on 
the issue of Syria. The mediation done by the Joint Special Envoy is of im-
portance and the realistic way to peruse. It is in the delegation opinion that the 
draft resolution undermines the Special Envoy´s work and the consensus reached 
at the Geneva meeting.176 Thirdly, the principles of sovereign equality and non-
interference in internal affairs are the foundation of the Charter. This has consist-
ently been one of the key point in the Chinese arguments concerning the question 
of Syria and that the fate of Syria should be decided independently by the Syrian 
people.177 Fourthly, the draft resolution jeopardises the unity of the Security 
Council. According to the delegation, the discussion during the meeting concern-
ing the draft resolution the supporting members of the resolution did not show 
any political will or cooperation and refusing to make any revisions or consulta-
tions.178 For the mentioned reasons, China did not accept the draft resolution on 
19 July 2012. 
 
The discussed draft resolution confirmed that the situation in Syria constitutes a 
threat to international peace and security. Therefor the classification of the con-
flict would have increased if it would have been adopted. However, the draft 
included measures in accordance with Chapter VII and therefor lost the Russian 
vote. In their opinion would a Chapter VII resolution open the path for an uncer-
tain future of the conflict, in addition to violate the international principles. The 
Chinese delegation stipulated that the resolution would undermine the ongoing 
political dialogues and solutions, such as the Special Envoy. 
 
Continuing with the arguments for the draft resolution on 28 February 2017 con-
cerning the Security Council´s response to the OPCW reports, the Russian dele-
gation motived their vote since the nature of the text is offensive, flawed and 
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unacceptable.179 The delegation raised their scepticism concerning the conclu-
sions drawn in the third and fourth reposts180 of the Joint Investigative Mecha-
nism181 of the OPCW and the United Nations to investigate the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria. According to the Russian delegation, the conclusions from the 
reports were not based on convicting evidence, nor did the investigation consider 
the fact that besides Islamic State and the Levant, the widespread of toxic sub-
stances by the Al-Nusra Front and other opposition groups.182 The delegation 
claims that the problem is that the information the experts based their report on 
is provided by: “[…]armed opposition sympathetic international non-govern-
mental organizations, the media and so called friends of Syria.”183 The purpose 
of the JIM work is that it would be founded on a basis of impartiality and estab-
lished facts. The delegation believes that the JIM activities will go beyond Syria 
to include the neighbouring countries and that the mandate will provide for real 
counter-terrorism measures. Based on the report, the Russian delegation claims 
that there is no justification to conclude that Syria has failed to comply with the 
Chemical Weapons Convention or resolution 2118 (2013).184 
 
In addition to the arguments concerning the report from the JIM and OPCW, the 
delegation raised their questions concerning the justification of sanctions in the 
draft resolution. In the delegation opinion, the JIM report brought forward at the 
meeting did not speak about any Syrian officials, scientific institutions or eco-
nomic entities.185 The delegation also argued that an embargo on exports to Syria 
could adversely affect the fulfilment of major agricultural and economic needs. 
The ban on the provisions of helicopters and spare parts could indeed be an at-
tempt to undermine the counter terrorism efforts.186 In conclusion, the Russian 
delegation claims that the draft resolution is an attempt to undermine political 
and diplomatic efforts. To impose unilateral and multilateral sanctions would 
only weaken the international counter-terrorism efforts.187 
 
The Chinese delegation followed their arguments in the same line as the conclu-
sions from the Russian delegation. According to the Chinese delegation, a new 
round of Geneva peace talk is under way and there is an opportunity to find a 
political solution. Due to the information mentioned, it is the Chinese standpoint 
that the international community should remain committed to political solu-
tion.188 Any actions or decisions that runs counter to the fundamental interests of 
the people of Syria, should not be allowed by the Council.189 It is too early to 
                                                
179 UNSC 7893th Meeting (28 February 2017) UN Doc S/PV.7893, p.6. 
180 See S/2016/738/Rev.1 and S/2016/888. 
181 Hereinafter JIM. 
182 UNSC 7893th Meeting (28 February 2017) UN Doc S/PV.7893, p.7. 
183 UNSC 7893th Meeting (28 February 2017) UN Doc S/PV.7893, p.7. 
184 UNSC 7893th Meeting (28 February 2017) UN Doc S/PV.7893, p.7. 
185 UNSC 7893th Meeting (28 February 2017) UN Doc S/PV.7893, p.7 
186 UNSC 7893th Meeting (28 February 2017) UN Doc S/PV.7893, p.8. 
187 UNSC 7893th Meeting (28 February 2017) UN Doc S/PV.7893, p.8. 
188 UNSC 7893th Meeting (28 February 2017) UN Doc S/PV.7893, p.9. 
189 UNSC 7893th Meeting (28 February 2017) UN Doc S/PV.7893, p.9. 
 41 
draw any final conclusions from the present investigations on the use of chemical 
weapons. The Council shall continue the support to the OPCW and JIM investi-
gations to be based on objective and fair criteria in accordance with the mandate 
set out in resolution 2319 (2016). According to the Chinese delegation, there 
were differences between the members of the Council and in the delegation´s 
opinion it is not the helpful way to find a solution to the issue of chemical weap-
ons in Syria, nor to the peaceful talks in Geneva.190 
 
Resolution 2118 (2013) was adopted by the Security Council and underscored 
that a violation of the resolution would be followed by measures in accordance 
with Chapter VII. The OPCW is an international organisation with the purpose 
to ensure that the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention191 is 
achieved and that member states follows the convention.192 The OPCW received 
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2013193 and to criticise their work raises scepticism. One 
could question the method of the information gathering by the organisation. It is 
one thing to say that the implement measures under Chapter VII is not the solu-
tion nor the path for the Security Council to take for the question on Syria. How-
ever, to call the OPCW an impartial actor raises scepticism about the delega-
tions.194 That a resolution of this character will have an impact is not deniable, 
but in the light of resolution 2118 (2013) that supported the work by the OPCW 
– it is interesting that the member states changes their opinion about the organi-
sation. Unfortunately, it is a matter of rhetoric´s that determines whether the de-
cision could be a threat to international peace and security.195 
 
4.1.3 The ICC 
In 2013, the situation in Syria had escalated with increasing numbers of refugees, 
as well as reported attacks of chemical weapons in Syria.196 The statement re-
leased on 2 October 2013 following the 7039th meeting of the Security Council, 
and urged all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities, to take all necessary 
steps to facilitate the efforts of United Nations.197 The statement condemned the 
increased terrorist attacks and stresses the magnitude of the humanitarian tragedy 
caused by the conflict, in addition to further urging the Syrian authorities to take 
immediate steps to facilitate the expansion of humanitarian relief operations.198  
 
As a response to the presidential statement above, the submitted draft resolution 
on the 7180th meeting of the Security Council noted the repeated encouragement 
by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights for the Security Council to 
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refer the situation to the International Criminal Court in order to investigate vio-
lations of international and humanitarian law. The draft resolution states that the 
situation in Syria constitutes a threat to international peace and security.199 As 
previous draft resolution 19 July 2012, this resolution listed new actions to be 
taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For example:  
 
7. Decides that nationals, current or former officials or person-
nel from a State outside the Syrian Arab Republic which is not 
a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that State for all 
alleged acts or omissions arising out of or related to operations 
in the Syrian Arab Republic established or authorized by the 
Council, unless such exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly 
waived by the State;200 
 
The Russian delegation called the draft resolution a blow to the permanent mem-
bers unity and an attempt to create a pretext for armed intervention in the Syrian 
conflict.201 As a result of the unity, the resolutions 2118 (2013) and 2139 (2014) 
were adopted.202  According to the delegation the so called Caesar report203 was 
used for the introduction to the draft resolution; however, the delegation argues 
that the report was based on: “[…] unconfirmed information obtained from un-
verifiable sources and therefore cannot serve as a platform for taking such a 
serious decision.”204  
 
Concerning the use of the International Criminal Court,205 the delegation argues 
it will further inflame political passion and lay the groundwork for eventual mil-
itary intervention from the outside. The last time the Security Council referred a 
case to the ICC, it was the Libyan dossier through resolution 1970 (2011). It is 
the opinion of the Russian delegation that it did not help to resolve the crisis, but 
instead added more firewood to the flames of the conflict. The delegation further 
criticises the ICC by stating that the court´s decision did not contribute to a return 
of normalcy or justice in Libya and evaded the most pressing issues, i.e. the death 
of civilians due to the result of NATO bombardments. In addition to mention the 
practice from Security Council resolution, the delegation mentioned other per-
manent members view on the ICC. For example, the United States reluctances to 
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accede to the Roman Statute and how the United Kingdom is for some reason 
unenthusiastic about the exploration by the ICC of crimes committed by British 
nationals during the Iraq war.206 
 
The delegation´s arguments continues with the military aspect and argued that 
pursuing a regime change by force in Syria will prolong the crisis and undermines 
the Geneva negotiations. The delegation continued that they proceed from the 
premise that the Geneva communiqué of 30 June 2012 is the core of efforts to 
settle the Syrian crisis.207 “The communiqué interprets the principles of account-
ability and national reconciliation as interrelated, leaving the leading role in that 
process to the Syrians themselves.”208 
 
Compared to reasons and arguments presented by the Russian delegation, the 
Chinese delegation had a more structured approach. First, the delegation believed 
that any action to seek the recourse of the ICC should be conducted based on 
respect for the state judicial sovereignty and the principle of complementarity. 
Since China is not a state party to the Roman Statute, they will always have res-
ervations concerning the referral by the Security Council to the ICC.209 Secondly, 
any efforts to seek a political settlement to the question of Syria will encounter 
difficulties. By refereeing the situation of Syria to the ICC is not conductive to 
build up trust among all parties in Syria or to an early resumption of the negotia-
tions in Geneva.210 Thirdly, the delegation believes that the Council should con-
tinue in the line with consultations in order to avoid undermining Council unity 
or obstruction and cooperation on questions such as Syria and other serious is-
sues.211 Since the Chinese approach and opinions has not been taken into account, 
thus the delegation has voted against the resolution.212 China remains committed 
to seek a political settlement to the question of Syria. 
 
The argument from the Russian delegation concerning mentioned Caesar report 
by needs further confirmation before it can be a sole determining factor of evi-
dence of torture, is a valid point. A referral to the ICC might not be the solution 
if the parties want to find a diplomatic and political solution to the situation. 
However, the delegation mentions resolution 2118 (2013) as a reflection of unity 
from the Security Council, yet the delegation will not follow the information pre-
sented by the OPCW and implement measures under Chapter VII.213 
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4.1.4 International Syrian Support Group214 
As previous examined draft resolutions from the Security Council in this thesis, 
the draft resolution on 8 October 2016 recalled relevant resolutions and con-
demned the events taking place in Syria; however, compared to previous drafts, 
this draft resolution has a stronger language as it states the Security Council as 
gravely distressed by the continued deterioration of the devastating humanitarian 
situation, expressing outrage at the alarming number of civilian casualties and 
strongly condemning the increased terrorist attacks.215 In addition, the draft text 
states grave concern regarding the lack of effective implementation of Security 
Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014) and 2258 (2016).216 
The draft text recalled that member states are in accordance with article 25 of the 
UN Charter, obliged to accept and carry out Council´s decisions.217 Once more, 
the draft resolution that the situation in Syria continues to be a threat to interna-
tional peace and security.218 Furthermore, the draft resolution reiterates that the 
sustainable solution to the situation in Syria is an inclusive and Syrian-led polit-
ical process with full implementation of the Geneva Communiqué and resolu-
tions 2254 (2015) and 2268 (2016).219 
 
One of the reasons behind the changes of language in this draft resolution, are 
the events taking place in, and around, the city Aleppo in Syria. The city has 
played a key role in the conflict, as its location have been important and the city 
have been rebel-controlled since 2011. In September 2016, the Russian-Syrian 
coalition started a month-long aerial bombing of opposition-controlled territory 
in Aleppo. Regarding the bombings in Aleppo by Russian and Syrian forces, it is 
worth noting that Human Rights Watch condemns the month-long actions as war 
crime, due to the killing of civilians and affected hospitals.220 
 
This is the fifth time Russia has blocked council action since the conflict began 
in 2011, but also the first time China brake ranks with Russia on a Syria veto and 
abstained.221 The critics raised from the Russian delegation on the draft resolution 
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focused mainly on the ban on all military flights over Aleppo in Syria. In their 
opinion the suggestion has not been thought through, since it´s the eastern side 
of the city which have been under fire, while the western part is controlled by the 
Government.222 According to the delegation, another main point is that the reso-
lution would directly or indirectly predetermined the course of actions.223 How-
ever, the flaw of this argument is that the delegation does not provide any details 
on how a military flight ban would predetermine the course of actions in the Syr-
ian conflict from a Security Council standpoint of view.224 Another problem with 
the draft resolution according to the Russian delegation is that the resolution pro-
poses a duplicate plan of the function of the ISSG provided in Security Council 
resolution 2268 (2016).225 
 
The Russian delegation drafted their own resolution in order to demonstrate that 
a reasonable course of collective actions can be a possible.226 The delegation ar-
gues that their resolution emphasises the importance of unconditional compliance 
with resolution 2254 (2015) – both political, humanitarian and counter-terrorism. 
It is in the delegation´s opinion that work for progress should be made in all di-
rections simultaneously.227 Their draft resolution had support from China, how-
ever, since this is the resolution were China did not veto a draft resolution at the 
same time as Russia, it is of interest to mention the Chinese delegation´s opinion 
brought forward at the meeting.  
 
The Chinese delegation continued to maintain their opinion that actions taken by 
the Security Council should be able to concretely improve the situation in Syria, 
for example help to push for cessation of hostilities, support and coordinate UN 
efforts for humanitarian assistance. The draft resolution contains several of im-
portant elements, such as call for a political solution, improvement of humanitar-
ian situation, as well as enhanced efforts to combat terrorism.228 However, the 
Chinese delegation points out that some of the provisions of the draft resolution 
do not fully respect the sovereignty, independency and territorial integrity of 
Syria. In addition, the delegation states that constructive views of Security Coun-
cil members were not incorporated. Thus, China abstained from voting of the 
draft resolution.229 
 
One of the difficulties when examining the veto reasons from any permanent 
member, is that a permanent member does not need to elaborate their reason. 
Therefore, the political motives overshadow the legal aspect of the argument. In 
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the Russian delegation opinion, the vetoed draft resolution needs further clarifi-
cation on the matter of military flights and on the matter of how the resolution 
would impact the city. The Chinese delegation continue to support their argument 
with the international principles concerning that some actions and measures sug-
gested in the draft resolution would conflict with the principles. However, it is in 
the delegation´s opinions that the draft resolution would overstep and concur with 
the mandate of the ISSG. As previously mentioned by the delegations are the will 
to find a political solutions and initiate dialogues to solve the conflict, i.e. the 
ISSG trumps any suggestions of in the line with the draft resolution.230 
 
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in response to the vetoed draft resolution, a 
global coalition of 233 CSO´s on 1 December 2016 called upon UN member 
states to request an Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly to:” 
[…] demand an end to all unlawful attacks in Aleppo and elsewhere in Syria, and 
immediate and unhindered humanitarian access so that life-saving aid can reach 
all those in need.”231 
 
4.1.5 Security Council´s Provisional Rules of Procedure 
The draft resolution decided that all parties to the Syrian conflict shall cease fire, 
24 hours after the adoption of the resolution. The purpose of the resolution is to 
allow urgent humanitarian needs to be addressed for a period of seven days.232 In 
addition, the draft resolution demands all parties to the conflict to cease all col-
laboration with Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, Al-Nusra Front, and other 
terrorist groups, as designated by the Council.233 Furthermore, the draft empha-
sises that the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Syria constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security.234 
 
The Russian delegation initiated their statement by saying that the submitted draft 
resolution violates the Security Council´s Rules of Procedure, since the draft res-
olution was submitted the same day as the meeting. According to the Russian 
delegation, there is a 24-hour rule once the draft resolution has been submitted, 
thus giving the other members of the Security Council a chance to comment on 
the draft resolution and reach a consensus on a draft resolution.235 Furthermore, 
the Russian delegation continues to prioritise political dialogues, including with 
other member states of the Council. The vetoed draft resolution refers to a cessa-
tion of hostilities and not concerning the withdrawal of fighters from eastern 
Aleppo. The stated motivations from the delegation has more of a political char-
acter, thus making it difficult to distinguish their legal arguments on why the veto 
was used. However, their strongest card for this draft resolution is the breach of 
the 24-hour rule. 
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Regarding the Chinese delegation´s argument on vetoing the draft resolution, 
they continue to maintain their position that an action from the Security Council 
must be a consensus. The issue must be by seeking a solution through peaceful 
negotiations and dialogue.236 The opinion from the Chinese is that Security Coun-
cil should maintain unity and speak as one voice, hence the work together must 
play a constructive role for a political settlement of the question of Syria.237 How-
ever, the short time between submitting the draft resolution and the meeting made 
the effort to seek consensus to short. 
 
According to the General Assembly rule 78, a draft resolution must be circulated 
at least the day before a vote is taken. However, there is no such written request 
in the Security Council´s Provisional Rules of Procedure. There do exist a de 
facto 24-hour rule in the practice of the Council and is often interpreted to mean 
an overnight wait for a draft resolution.238 A discussion has been raised if rule 26 
of the Council´s Provisional Rules of Procedure applies to draft resolution; hence 
it might be interpreted that the 24-hour rule suspends rule 26. The purpose of rule 
26 is to ensure that the members of the Council have received all documents in 
sufficient time for them to define their position on the matter before consideration 
in the Council meeting.239 In reflection to the non-written rule in the Security 
Council on the de facto rule, one can conclude that it is a customary rule which 
have been established and approved by the member states. Thus, the arguments 
presented by Russia are not out of context.240 
 
4.2 When a resolution is adopted 
This section of the chapter will focus on selected adopted resolutions by the Se-
curity Council, concerning the conflict in Syria. All of them have been approved 
and adopted by members of the Security Council; however, why did they get 
approved by the permanent member states? The purpose of this part of the thesis 
is to provide counterarguments to section 4.1 and to analyse the reasons why 
these resolutions were adopted. The focus will be on the arguments provided by 
the permanent members of the Council, especially from Russia and China due to 
their veto decisions. However, it is worth noting that there have been difficulties 
to find separate arguments from each permanent member. Specifically, when the 
resolution was voted in favour by all permanent members. 
 
4.2.1 Missions 
On 21 April 2012, resolution 2043 (2012) was unanimously adopted by the Se-
curity Council with the purpose to establish the United Nations Supervision Mis-
sion in Syria.241 The Council established UNSMIS for a 90-day period and up to 
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300 unarmed military observers. Furthermore it: “[…] decides further that the 
Mission shall be deployed expeditiously subject to assessment by the Secretary-
General of relevant developments on the ground, including the consolidation of 
the cessation of violence;”242  
 
In addition, the resolution affirms the support to the Joint Special Envoy of the 
United Nations and the League of Arab States, as well as nothing the Syrian gov-
ernment´s commitment on 25 March 2012 to implement the six-pint proposal of 
the Envoy.243 Further on the resolution called upon the Syrian government to 
ensure the effective operation, as well the parties to guarantee the safety of the 
mission personnel. To ensure effective operation, the resolution lists several re-
quested actions, for example facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deploy-
ment of its personnel and capabilities as required to fulfil its mandate. 244   
 
Turning to the arguments by the permanent members, the Russian delegation ar-
gued that the resolution established clear parameters of responsibility for all the 
Syrian parties on the cessation of violence, as well as on the need to cooperate 
with the UN observers and the Joint Special Envoy mission. “The resolution 
sends an important international legal signal, namely, that only the Security 
Council has the prerogative to take a decision regarding the settlement of a re-
gional crisis, including the Syrian crisis.”245 Even though the French delegation 
agreed with the Russian delegation and other members regarding the positive 
outcome of the meeting, the French delegation raised their concern that the Syr-
ian parties have not implemented measures they committed to do to the Joint 
Special Envoy.246 The Chinese delegation structured their argument in similar 
manners as previous meetings concerning draft resolution, i.e. the standpoint is 
on the respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Syria.247 
 
The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2268 (2016), endorsing 
the deal announced in the Joint Statement by the United States and the Russian 
Federation, co-chairs of the ISSG. The statement was made on 11 February 2016 
and included the establishment of an ISSG humanitarian task force and an ISSG 
ceasefire task force.248 The resolution demanded that all parties to the agreement 
live up to its terms, and urged all member states to use their influence to ensure 
that parties to the conflict fulfil their commitments and create the conditions for 
a durable and lasting ceasefire. Furthermore, the Security Council demands full 
and immediate implementation of resolution 2254 (2015) to facilitate a Syrian-
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led and Syrian-owned political transition, in accordance with the Geneva Com-
muniqué as set forth by the ISSG.249 
 
In conclusion, the arguments presented by the permanent members of the Council 
for the two resolution, supports the actions of establishing missions for humani-
tarian reasons. UNSMIS was created in the early years of the conflict and therefor 
had a more fact-finding mission character. When it comes to the second resolu-
tion in this section of the thesis, it is the result of the ISSG work and as well as 
the continuously stand point from Russia and China, i.e. to find a path for politi-
cal solutions.250 The comprehensive ceasefire gives the possibility to conduct po-
litical dialogues to find a political settlement of the Syrian issue.251 
 
4.2.2 OPCW 
On 21 August 2013, the use of chemical weapons was made in attacks in the city 
of Damascus, Syria. The death toll was put at more than 1300 people and 
Medicins Sans Frontieres said to the BBC that at least 3600 patients displayed 
neurotoxic symptoms.252 
 
With resolution 2118 (2013) the Security Council reaffirms that the use of chem-
ical weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The resolu-
tion recalls that the Syrian Arab Republic in 1968, acceded to the Protocol for 
the Prohibition of the Use in War Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and 
of Bacterial Methods of Warfare, signed in Geneva 1925. As a response to the 
attacks in Damascus, the Secretary-General established a United Nations Mission 
to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab 
Republic.253 The Mission had the function as a fact-finding mission and accord-
ing to the Missions report of 16 September 2013, it affirmed the use of chemical 
weapons is a serious violation of international law. In addition, the report con-
demned the killing of the civilian and as a result from the attacks in Damascus, 
as well underscored the need for the Mission to fulfil its mandate.254 
 
Resolution 2118 also recalls the obligation for all states under Security Council 
resolution 1540 (2004) to: “[…] refrain from providing any form of support to 
non-State actors that attempt to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, 
transport, transfer or use weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weap-
ons, and their means of deliver.”255 The Council decides in resolution 2118 
(2013), to welcome the decision of the Executive Council of the OPCW of 27 
September 2013 to establish special procedures for expeditious destruction of the 
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Syrian Arab Republic´s chemical weapons program.256 The resolution contains 
twenty-two decisions taken by the Council; however, it does not clearly entail if 
they are in accordance with Chapter VI or VII. A few of the decisions concerns 
the OPCW and decides that the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with 
the OPCW and the UN, as well as authorises an advanced team of UN personnel 
to provide assistance to the OPCW activities in Syria.257 Most importantly, the 
resolution affirms that any use of chemical weapons constitutes a threat to inter-
national peace and security.258 
 
The Russian delegation believed that the resolution would make it possible to 
solve the problem of chemical weapons in Syria, but also: “[…] give us impetus 
in connection with a decision on the creation in the Middle East of a zone free of 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, in accordance with the 
decisions taken by the international community.”259 According to the delegation, 
the importance with the resolution is that it sets out a framework for political and 
diplomatic settlement of the Syrian crisis. In addition, the resolution adopts the 
Geneva communiqué from 30 June 2012 (S/2012/253, annex) as a platform.260 
The delegation emphasised that the resolution was not passed under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter; however, violations of the requirements and the use of chem-
ical weapons by anyone must be investigated. Furthermore, the delegation men-
tions that in the event of non-compliance, the Council will impose measures un-
der Chapter VII of the UN Charter.261 Similar conclusions were drawn by the 
other permanent members of the Council. From the meeting, there is a sense of 
unity between the members in their reasoning of the OPCW and the United Na-
tions Mission. In addition, China continued to maintain that political solution and 
the destruction of chemical weapons must go side by side.262 
 
By a vote of fourteen in favour and one abstention from Venezuela, the Security 
Council adopted resolution 2209 (2015), expressing deep concern that toxic 
chemicals had been used as a weapon in Syria, as concluded by the OPCW fact-
finding mission. The Security Council decided that in the event of non-compli-
ance with resolution 2118 (2013),263 the Council would impose measures under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Toxic chemicals used as a weapon 
would violate resolution 2118 (2013) and the CWC.264 
 
Furthermore, the Council recalled its decision in resolution 2209 that Syria 
should: “[…] not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain 
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chemical weapons, or transfer them directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to 
other States or non-State actors […]”265 The resolution reiterated that no party 
in the country should act as such. The Council expressed their continued support 
to the work of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in the resolution, especially in 
particular to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chem-
ical weapons in Syria.266 In addition to confirming the work of the fact-finding 
mission, the resolution constitutes that the use of chlorine gas as a weapon of war 
in conflict is a breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention.267 However, there 
are differences of opinions whether it is the government of Syria that uses chem-
ical weapons – it depends on how the member state analyses the report from the 
OPCW and their political opinion.268 Even though the resolution was voted in 
favour by all the permanent members of the Council and all had the same opinion 
concerning chlorine gas, the Russian delegation underscored that they will not 
accept any actions under Chapter VII of the Charter without an attempt to con-
firm the allegations based on proof.269 
 
The argumentation and differences of opinions concerning the OPCW and the 
Joint Mission by the UN, does not end here. The draft resolution of February 
2017 was vetoed by Russia and China. Some of the arguments stated by the Rus-
sian delegation at the meeting concerning resolution 2209, correlates with the 
arguments of why the draft resolution was vetoed in February 2017. The actions 
by the two permanent members contradicts the purpose of the adopted resolution 
and their veto concerning the draft resolution in February 2017. In their opinion 
the conclusions from the reports from the OPCW are not enough to justify 
measures under Chapter VII; however, the organisation was given the unanimous 
support from the Council with the adopted resolution. Concern is raised if their 
arguments for a veto of the OPCW reports are justified.270  
 
4.2.3 Humanitarian assistance 
The Security Council unanimously adopted the resolution 2139 (2014) and de-
manded that all parties allowed delivery of humanitarian assistance, cease the 
depriving civilians of food and medicine.271 The resolution further demanded the 
parties to respect the principle of medical neutrality, as well facilitate free pas-
sage to all areas for medical personnel, equipment and transport. The Security 
Council strongly condemns the increased terrorist attacks carried out by organi-
sations and individuals associated with Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist 
groups.272 The resolution text urges opposition groups to maintain the rejection 
of groups and individuals which are responsible for violations of international 
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humanitarian law. In addition, the resolution: 
 
[…] calls upon the Syrian authorities and opposition groups 
to commit to combating and defeating organizations and indi-
viduals associated with Al-Qaeda, its affiliates and other ter-
rorist groups, demands that all foreign fighters immediately 
withdraw from Syria, and reaffirms that terrorism in all its 
forms and manifestations constitutes one of the most serious 
threats to international peace and security […].273 
 
The resolution also demanded that all parties, particularly the Syrian authorities, 
fully implement the provisions of the 2 October 2013 Statement by the President 
of the Security Council.274 The provisions included facilitating the expansion of 
humanitarian relief operations, in accordance with applicable provisions of inter-
national humanitarian law and the United Nations guiding principles of humani-
tarian emergency assistance.275 
 
The consensus among the members in the Council are clear when reading the 
meeting record and the focus is on the humanitarian aspect of the conflict. Even 
though there are differences of opinions between the member states, this resolu-
tion is an example of when humanitarian crisis is put first. The resolution con-
siders the part of terrorists, as well as organisations and individuals associated 
with Al-Qaeda, have in the conflict in Syria: however, the focus and main pur-
pose with this resolution is to find a solution to the humanitarian crisis. 
 
4.2.4 Political dialogues 
Resolution 2254 (2015) was unanimously adopted by the Security Council and 
therefore reconfirmed its endorsement of the Geneva Communiqué. The resolu-
tion commends the diplomatic efforts of the ISSG and the outcome of the multi-
lateral talks on Syria in Vienna on 30 October 2015,276 as well as the statement 
of the ISSG of 14 November 2015 which stated the purpose if ensuring a Syrian-
led and Syrian-owned political transition based on the Geneva Communiqué.277 
The resolution demanded that all parties immediately cease any attacks against 
civilians and civilian objects, in addition to reiterates:  
 
[…] its call in resolution 2249 (2015) for Member States to 
prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as 
Da’esh), Al-Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, 
groups, undertakings, and entities associated with Al Qaeda 
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or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Secu-
rity Council, and as may further be agreed by the ISSG and 
determined by the Security Council, […]278 
 
Furthermore, the resolution approved the ISSG statements of 30 October and 14 
November 2015, as a step forward to implement the Geneva communiqué of 30 
July 2012.279 The resolution establishes that the three mentioned documents con-
stitutes the platform for resolving the crisis in Syria.280 Since the ISSG have been 
discussed on several occasions in this thesis, this section of the chapter might 
seem repetitive. However, it shows a valid point that the permanent members 
who have vetoed resolution concerning the question on Syria, does have a pref-
erence of supporting resolutions where political dialogues are in the focus.281 
 
4.3 Summary 
This chapter have been of a descriptive character. I have included a short reflec-
tion paragraph at the end of each section with the purpose to make the chapter 
less dense, as well start the discussion of all resolutions. Chapter five and six of 
the thesis are the analytical chapters, and will discuss the veto decisions in more 
detail in relation to legitimacy. Thus, this summary will be more brief regarding 
the veto decisions. The main common themes for the discussion of the veto de-
cisions are the international principles and Chapter VII. The stand point for the 
Chinese delegation is to find a political solution to the question of Syria, thus 
their arguments for each veto decision seems repetitive. Compared to the Chinese 
delegation, the arguments from the Russian delegation varied more depending on 
the draft resolution even though they always mentioned the international princi-
ples. 
 
First, the chapter have presented the veto decisions from permanent members on 
the question of Syria. Section 4.1 is divided in to five sections with focus on 
different draft resolutions and the arguments for the veto decisions. Section 4.1.1 
discusses the international principles as arguments for veto decisions, although 
the permanent members includes the solution of political dialogues as one of the 
purposes for the veto decisions. Section 4.1.2 discusses the arguments where 
Chapter VII have been the main character for the arguments, thus the language 
of the draft resolutions has been more discussed compared to previous draft res-
olutions. Due to that Russia have taken on the role of a diplomatic shield for Syria 
and promised the protection of Chapter VII measures from the Security Council, 
the question of legitimacy for the draft resolutions will be further discussed in 
chapter five.282 Section 4.1.3 focuses on the proposed draft resolution concerning 
the ICC. The main argument from the permanent members are the reluctance 
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towards the ICC from other permanent members concerning both the Rome Stat-
ute and exploration by the ICC of crimes during the Iraq war. Section 4.1.4 dis-
cusses the arguments of the ISSG as a veto argument in order to find a political 
solution to the conflict in Syria. Due to the bombing in Aleppo at the time, this 
draft resolution was criticised by CSO´s as the veto decision stopped a UN reac-
tion. Section 4.1.5 discusses the draft resolution that was vetoed due to the de 
facto 24-hour rule which is often interpreted as an overnight wait for a draft res-
olution. 
 
Second, the chapter have discussed a few selected adopted resolutions and the 
reasons for the selected resolutions have been discussed in section 1.2. Due to 
the prominent role of China and Russia for the veto decisions, the focus have 
more been towards their arguments. However, it is difficult to find unique sepa-
rate arguments from each permanent member. All the resolutions could be col-
lected under a common theme – initiatives. Section 4.2.1 discusses the resolu-
tions adopting UNSMIS and ISSG. The UNSMIS is an observation mission to 
evaluate the situation in Syria, whereas ISSG is an initiative for political dia-
logues. Section 4.2.2 presents the mandate and support for the OPCW by the 
Security Council. The purpose of the resolution is to support the fact-finding in-
vestigation by the OPCW on the use of chemical weapons in the conflict in Syria. 
Section 4.2.4 focuses on the initiatives of Geneva Communiqué and connects the 
resolution to the ISSG, as well as the arguments for political dialogues. 
 
In conclusion, this chapter have provided a lot of information to consider for the 
next chapters. However, it is necessary to examine the material thoroughly in 
order to take the next step for a legitimacy assessment. One need to have all the 
cards on the table to be able to assess the situations correctly. 
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5 Legitimacy assessment 
 
The purpose of exploring a legitimacy assessment for this thesis is to establish 
indicators which would indicate a potential shortage of legitimacy for veto deci-
sions. Since the thesis focuses on specific vetoed draft resolutions, there is a pos-
sibility for the assessment I suggest to not be applicable for other situations. How-
ever, the aim is to create an assessment that works on other similar questions or 
situations. Furthermore, as the focus is on the vetoes, the following discussion 
will be on the reasons for using the veto concerning the question of Syria; thus, 
other perspectives on legitimacy will not be discussed. With this reflection, the 
previous exploration on the relationship between law and politics becomes of 
relevance, as the reasons and arguments presented by the permanent members 
has some weight in the discussion.283 
 
The outline of this chapter is to first present what a legitimacy assessment ought 
to entail, including the parameters identified to use in such an assessment. Sec-
ondly, a discussion on who should conduct such a legitimacy assessment and 
thirdly, arguments against a legitimacy assessment. Finally, a legitimacy assess-
ment on the presented veto decisions in chapter four which will discuss whether 
the decisions lacked legitimacy.  
 
5.1 What ought a legitimacy assessment entail? 
Presented in the short introduction in this chapter, in order to determine if and 
how the vetoes discussed in chapter four are in line with the purpose of interna-
tional peace and security, one has to determine whether the veto decisions have 
legitimacy.  
 
The structure of the legitimacy assessment, would be in my opinion, similar with 
an intervention of the permanent members conduct regarding veto decisions. De-
pending on the draft resolution which have been brought to a vote at a Security 
Council meeting, the decision of initiating a legitimacy assessment would be on 
a case-by-case basis and examined in accordance with the, soon to be discussed, 
parameters. Since the decision of an assessment would be initiated after the meet-
ing and the outcome of the votes, the dimension on whom would, and could, 
report to the responsible subsidiary organ must be further explored.284 Should the 
right to report one or more permanent members be given only to the all fifteen 
members of the Security Council, since they have attended the meeting and know 
what was said or should the right extend to all members of the UN? One could 
argue that the assessment is only a question that matters for the proceedings in 
the Security Council, thus, all the members of the Security Council ought to have 
the right to report to the responsible subsidiary body. Since the General Assembly 
has a possibility to act on matters when the Security Council fails to exercise their 
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primarily responsibility, in accordance with the Uniting for Peace Resolution285, 
it is in my opinion that the primarily right to report a veto decision should be 
given to all the members of the Security Council.  
 
5.1.1 Indicators 
After determining the purpose of an assessment of legitimacy, the next step is to 
explore the possible indicators for such an assessment. In perspective to the pur-
pose of the questions for my thesis, the indicators must be helpful towards ana-
lysing a veto decision, as well reflect upon the function and purpose of the Secu-
rity Council. Hence the voting process is one of the main pillars, therefor the veto 
decision is at the core of the Council. Due to the political nuance of the Security 
Council, it has become a challenge to identify indicators that are objective to the 
legal purpose of legitimacy. The two indicators I have identified for the purpose 
to initiate a legitimacy assessment, as well be used during the assessment are 
explored in the following to sections.  
 
5.1.1.1 International peace and security 
The definition of the term international peace and security was discussed in sec-
tion 1.4.  Before exploring the term as an indicator for legitimacy, the term will 
be briefly presented again. Article 1 of the UN Charter uses the term `interna-
tional peace and security´ when describing the fundamental purpose of the UN. 
Peace or universal peace can be found separately throughout the Charter; how-
ever, nowhere is international security to be found used alone. The Preamble to-
gether with articles 1, 2 and 3 indicates that peace is to be defined more than 
absence of war.286 Connecting article 1 paragraph 2, which aims at strengthening 
peace through development of friendly relations among nations, to article 1 par-
agraph 3, which indicates that the function of the UN is to bring stabilisation of 
international relations, shows there is a close relationship between international 
security and peace, even though the interpretation spectrum of peace is broad.287 
 
The term international security consists of both a subjective and an objective el-
ement. It implies the right of every state to take advantage of any relevant support 
system when in need, but at the same time implying the legal obligation for every 
state to support such systems.288 The reference to international peace and security 
is to be understood as the overarching purpose of the UN, while the suppression 
of aggression only is referred as one objective to be achieved through measures 
of collective security. This entails that international peace and security may be 
endangered by not only act of aggressions, but also any other threat of to peace. 
Further on does it mean that the Security Council may direct measures against a 
state being the victim of aggression if and to the extent that the measure effec-
tively preserves international peace and security.289 
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Why this is one of my chosen indicators, is because the purpose of the Security 
Council is rooted in the term and therefor one needs to evaluate if a veto decision 
is in the interest of international peace and security. The present situation for a 
permanent member to use their right of veto, does not entail a need to explain or 
elaborate their reasons. In my opinion this should be a requirement to use the 
veto, thus it effects not only the politics at the UN, but also in a sense the inter-
national peace and security. As politics and law in the UN are interconnected, 
this indicator for an assessment would entail whether the veto has a legal standing 
on its own or if the permanent member own politics overshadows the function of 
the Security Council. Adding the legitimacy aspect to the indicator, connects the 
political aspects to the discussion. The political contestation around legitimacy is 
an indicator itself that legitimation is never complete and never unanimous; 
hence it is inevitably subject to the discussion of controversy, undermining, and 
competitive reinterpretation.290 The question to be answered with this indicator 
is how can a veto undermine international peace and security, since it does not 
constitute any ordinary threat? Hence, the discussion concerning threat on inter-
national peace and security usually is in the context on use of force. 
 
5.1.1.2 Respect for international conventions, customary rules and principles 
The second indicator is a bit more fluid to describe. The idea behind it is to create 
an indicator adaptable to a case-by-case basis. Depending on the draft resolution, 
the discussion on policy, treaties, sanctions etc. might differ. However, it is in 
my opinion an important factor for the discussion on resolutions. Another im-
portant guiding information for the legitimacy is, if there has been any previous 
adopted resolution on the same question, or similar and could be considerate to 
be an important guiding resolution. The question to be answered by this indicator 
is whether the veto decision works against any convention, rule or principle. 
 
In the delimitation section in the first chapter, I wrote that human rights will not 
be a part of the thesis. However, for this indicator there is the option to include 
different fields of international law when determining the legitimacy of veto de-
cisions. In addition, other fields of international law could indication if there is a 
lack of legitimacy in the veto decision or that there is a breach or threat to inter-
national peace and security. This indicator will become clearer in section 5.4, 
when assessing the legitimacy of the discussed vetoes in this thesis. 
 
5.2 Who should conduct a legitimacy assessment? 
Upon discussion on the international law and the UN, the most authoritative actor 
is the Security Council. The Security Council performs duties related to the clas-
sification conflicts as threats or breach of peace, in addition to being able to au-
thorise peacekeeping missions and fact-finding missions.291 The Council would 
therefor normally be the actor to suggest for a legitimacy assessment; however, 
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since the assessment is of the conduct by the permanent members there might be 
a conflict of interest. In addition, the political division in the Council, depending 
on the question, might have an addition negative influence and therefor, would 
the Security Council not be competent to decide for such an assessment. Further-
more, it is not uncommon that a permanent member in the Council has a political 
stake in an international conflict, thus, it is a risk that a permanent member might 
veto the assessment for political reasons. This is if the legitimacy assessment is 
not to be included as a procedural matter. For example, have Russia vowed to 
prevent any chapter VII resolutions on the crisis in Syria and therefor has a po-
litical stake in the conflict.292 Thus, one option would be for the Security Council 
to create a subsidiary organ with the mandate to conducts the legitimacy assess-
ment. In my opinion, this solution would keep the potential conflict within the 
Council and not affect the entire UN. The mandate of the organ would include 
the conduct proceedings of a legitimacy assessment of veto decisions, as well 
include the assessment of decisions for adopted resolutions. The reason to include 
the assessment of adopted resolution would be to consider the legitimacy, for 
example resolutions for sanctions, interventions etc. from the Security Council.  
Including the assessment for draft and adopted resolutions would create an expert 
subsidiary organ which examines the Security Council. However, this thesis fo-
cuses on the legitimacy of the veto decisions and therefor, the legitimacy assess-
ment of adopted resolutions will not be further explored.293  
 
A recommendation would be to use the experts on international law working at 
the UN; thus, utilising the expertise from existing organs in the organisations. 
My recommendation would be to turn to the International Law Commission,294 
as their purpose of promoting progressive development of international law and 
their work include to issue reports and studies, as well has formulated documents 
such as the Principles of International Law.295 The members of the ILC remains 
in office for five years and my suggestion is that the subsidiary organ to conduct 
the legitimacy assessment ought to be consisting of experts from the ILC. A sug-
gestion might be to appoint previous members of the ILC, thus avoiding the prob-
lem of having a member on two posts and minimise the risk conflict of interests. 
 
The Security Council only represents a few member states of the UN and therefor 
risks of being accused of having a democratic deficiency; however, since the fo-
cus of the legitimacy assessment would only effect the five permanent members 
of the Security Council and that the members of the Council are elected, such an 
accusation would be diminished. Although, to separate the assessment mandate 
from the Security Council would be possible if the General Assembly was given 
the mandate. The problem with the General Assembly is that their recommenda-
tions are non-binding, thus there might be a need to amend the articles concerning 
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the General Assembly and making their invitation to a legitimacy assessment 
binding upon member states. 
 
In conclusion, my recommendation is to create a subsidiary organ with the spe-
cific mandate to conduct these assessments.296 Since the focus of the assessment 
is concerning the permanent member, it is most logical that the group is created 
by the Security Council and that the elected members of the organ are from the 
international law experts working already within the UN.  
 
5.3 Arguments against a legitimacy assessment 
Arguments presented against a legitimacy assessment are partly drawn from the 
arguments presented by some of the permanent members for the veto decisions, 
and own conclusions. I will first discuss arguments concerning international prin-
ciples, secondly the possibility of risk of abuse and finally arguments concerning 
the possibility of sanctions.  
 
5.3.1 International principles 
In chapter two the principles of the international legal system were discussed and 
they are of relevance when it comes to the arguments against a legitimacy assess-
ment. The relevance of these principles are their functions; hence they interlink 
the arguments from the permanent members on why they vetoed with the inter-
pretation of the Charter. In addition to being the core of some of the arguments 
from the permanent members, the principles can also be seen as critic against a 
legitimacy assessment. The presumption of a veto decision is that it is in line with 
the international principles and therefor, could the questioning of the veto right 
conflict with the principles. 
 
One ought to assume that a permanent member decides to veto a resolution in 
good faith, thus it is expected from all member states in the Security Council. If 
a member states recommends an initiation of a legitimacy assessment, the ques-
tion could also be asked if that member states is acting in good faith or has polit-
ical means for its decision? One could hope that such a decision is done in the 
interest of international peace and security and to question the good faith aspect 
of a decision can become vague, due to the presumption of the principle. 
 
The principle of non-intervention affirms the central right of each state to inde-
pendence and to self-determination, hence the state´s rights to freely choose its 
political system for example.297 Non-intervention affirms the basic principle that 
states should not meddle in other states internal affairs. The question is if the 
legitimacy assessment could be regarded as intervening in states decision? To 
introduce a possible intervention on veto decisions could be concerned as an in-
tervention on states interests in the conflict; however, since the decisions from 
the Security Council ought to be in the interest of international peace and security 
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and not only the permanent members own state interest, it is my opinion debata-
ble whether the principle of non-intervention is of concern. The principle is one 
of the main arguments used by the permanent members for their vetoes, and in 
my opinion it could be applicable for raising concerns towards the assessment of 
vetoes. It could possibility be extended to include the right for permanent mem-
bers to independently decide their veto right. 
 
From my perspective, the veto system could be a good balance system when the 
Council is deciding on draft resolutions concerning difficult situations. The prin-
ciple of co-operations between states has the purpose to maintain international 
peace and security, thus applicable for the purpose of the Security Council. To 
invoke a legitimacy assessment could intimidate the principle and possible have 
the outcome of making states less co-operative with each other. The purpose of 
the assessment of vetoes is to see if the decisions have legitimacy, but could such 
a system have the opposite effect? It is a possibility, although the aim is to make 
the permanent members more transparent in their decision making. 
  
5.3.2 The risk of abuse 
There are rightful concerns to be raised whether an assessment of legitimacy is 
in risk of undermining the objectivity of the veto system of the Security Council, 
hence such an assessment might affect political motives and consensus among 
the permanent members. As discussed in section 3.2, the relationship between 
law and politics differs depending on the approach might have a different outlook 
on what the politics and law ought to be for the UN. Therefor there is a risk for 
different approaches on how to regard the legitimacy assessment. Without a clear 
presentation and guidelines for how the legitimacy assessment ought to be con-
ducted, there is a risk of abuse for political means from the members of the Se-
curity Council.  
 
The question is if a legitimacy assessment of a veto decision has the risk of be-
coming an obstacle for international peace and security? In my opinion, this is 
the Achilles-heel-question which points out the weakness of an assessment of the 
veto decision. Hence the objective purpose of the veto system is to protect inter-
national peace and security. Therefor the legitimacy assessment itself could be 
seen as potential undermining of all the Council decisions. From my point of 
view, one could argue that the veto system is a safety net from interventions and 
sanctions from the Council with the aim to protect the international rights and 
principles. In perspective to the veto decisions discussed in chapter four, it can 
be seen from its inception as a political pact among the great powers to keep 
peace among themselves in the Council.298 The Chinese delegation argued for 
their veto decision with the purpose to keep the unity of the Council, hence the 
focus of the draft resolution becomes on the peace among the permanent mem-
bers and not the draft resolution itself.299 Thus, the present veto system is under-
mining international peace and security by blockading actions from the Council 
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itself. The adopted resolutions concerning Syria, are initiatives to create forums 
for political discussions and create missions to assess the situation in Syria; how-
ever, when the presented draft resolutions are suggestions on reactions from the 
initiative, they are vetoed. This will be further discussed in the legitimacy assess-
ment in section 5.4. 
 
5.3.3 Can there be sanctions? 
As previously mention, the legitimacy assessment would be in the character of 
an intervention, but if there should be any sanctions is yet to be determined. Since 
the assessment is about the veto decisions, i.e. a right given to the permanent 
members, the question arises how can a sanction be delivered concerning a pro-
cedural right in the Security Council? Should it be in a similar conduct as the 
Universal Periodic Review, where the result will be a report from the mandated 
organ and the sanction would become the remarks from the report and nothing 
more? Thus, giving the permanent member state a chance to improve and in the 
future, be more considerate with their arguments for using the veto.  
 
Adding the requirement of presenting their arguments for the veto, it would in-
crease the transparency of the decision making from the Security Council. How-
ever, could any sanctions towards a permanent member be effective? I believe 
that transparency is a key factor for the discussion on legitimacy, but the problem 
is if a veto decision does not have legitimacy, then how should that effect the 
permanent member? To remove the permanent member their right of veto, the 
Charter must be amended. Due to the amendment process being complicated, it 
is not a solution in my opinion to remove the veto right.300 At the present stage, 
a review report from the subsidiary organ would be the solution. 
 
5.4 A legitimacy assessment of the vetoes 
For the legitimacy assessment, not all vetoes will be discussed. It is in the interest 
of the thesis that all the vetoes are representing and shows the differences of the 
draft resolutions and although they all interesting in their own character, consid-
ering the legitimacy assessment not all of them qualify. First, the veto in section 
4.1.5 regarding the Security Council´s Provisional Rules of Procedures, fall 
shorts for an assessment due to the 24-hour rule for draft resolutions. The draft 
resolution mentions the threat to international peace and security: however, the 
arguments for the veto decisions presented by China and Russia, focuses on the 
24-hour rule. Thus, an assessment on the first indicator cannot be satisfactorily 
preformed and the question on how the veto is taken in the interest of interna-
tional peace and security cannot be analysed. In addition, concerning the second 
indicator, the de facto-rule is accepted as a customary rule for Council proce-
dures, since it has been established and approved; thus, these veto decisions are 
legitimate in my opinion.  
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Nor will the second draft resolution in section 4.1.1. Draft resolution 77 focuses 
on the support towards the League of Arab States. The question on international 
peace and security is not raised in the draft text, nor in the veto decision argu-
ments. Although, the draft resolution is condemning the situation in Syria, as well 
as the evolvement of the situation; it is in my opinion, that the presented argu-
ments by the permanents members for their vetoes are due to the stand point of 
finding a political settlement to the conflict. The veto undermines the potential 
support and future collaborations between the UN and the League of Arab Stats 
on the question of Syria, but it is in my opinion not of concern for in the sense of 
international peace and security. According to Russia and China, the language of 
the draft resolution is not to their satisfactory for supporting a political solution. 
Thus, it is in my opinion that international peace and security is not jeopardised, 
nor is the resolution in conflict with any rules or principles. Therefor is draft 
resolution 77 not applicable for a legitimacy assessment. 
 
It is in my opinion that the vetoes in sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 are of more interest 
as these draft resolutions concerns more concrete actions from the Security Coun-
cil, such as Chapter VII decisions and the ICC. The first draft resolution in section 
4.1.1 will also be assessed, since the draft resolution brings forward the imple-
mentation of measures in accordance with article 41 of the Charter and the veto 
decisions in section 4.1.4 will be further discussed. 
 
5.4.1 International peace and security 
In section 5.1.1.1 the purpose of the first indicator for a legitimacy assessment 
was presented. Since the question to be answered by the indicator is, if a veto 
decision was taken in the interest of international peace and security and therefor 
is to be considered legitimate. In perspective to the stated question, the burden of 
proof must first be explored. In my opinion, the permanent member has a burden 
of reasoning for their veto decision. For example, if a draft resolution describes 
a situation as a threat to international peace and security, it is in my opinion that 
the permanent member who vetoed the draft must argue for why the draft reso-
lution is not compatible. The member state that have presented the draft resolu-
tion at have the burden of proof concerning the purpose of why the situation can 
be determined as a threat to international peace and security; however, there is 
also a responsibility for the permanent member to reason for the opposite if that 
is in the interest for the situation. This will be further explored as the veto deci-
sions for this thesis will be assessed. 
 
Beginning with the draft resolutions in section 4.1.1, draft resolution 616 had the 
purpose of being a unanimous response from the Council on the violation of hu-
man rights and the attack on diplomatic personnel.  Furthermore, draft resolution 
616 determined that the continued situation in Syria as a threat to international 
peace and security.301 The Russian and Chinese delegation argued for their vetoes 
due to the approach of confrontation in the draft resolution. The approach would 
contravene, among others, the principle of peaceful settlement; however, this will 
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be further discussed in section 5.4.2. Draft resolution 616 includes a possibility 
to impose measures in accordance with article 41 and due to the promise of a 
diplomatic shield by Russia to Syria concerning Chapter VII measures, the veto 
is undermined because of this political measure and therefor challenges the pur-
pose of international peace and security.302 The Chinese delegation present their 
arguments with the support of international principles, which becomes more in-
teresting in the second step of the assessment; however, their argument in re-
sponse to article 41 is that sanctions would not under the current circumstances 
resolve the situation in Syria. The problem with this argument is that it needs 
further explanation and as presented in the beginning of this section, a permanent 
member needs to argue why it is not in the interest for the situation. Thus, the 
veto decisions in accordance with the first step in the assessment does not have 
legitimacy. 
 
Draft resolution 538 in section 4.1.2, had the purpose of reaffirming the support 
of the Joint Special Envoy, League of Arab States and UNSMIS.303 In addition 
compared to draft resolution 616, this draft text lists several deciding actions in-
cluding for the Syrian authority to implement adopted resolutions 2042 (2012) 
and 2043 (2012) with the possibility to impose measures in accordance with ar-
ticle 41. Due to the previous discussed political shield from Russia, the veto is 
once more politically compromised and undermined. Furthermore, both Russia 
and China argues towards a political solution and that the draft text runs counter 
with the Geneva documents. However, the draft resolution has the purpose to 
support political initiatives, but with a firm standing towards Syrian authorities 
and the implementation of adopted resolutions. The Chinese delegation does not 
present any strong arguments concerning the draft resolution in context to inter-
national peace and security, hence the focus is on the political solutions and in-
ternational principles. The veto decisions at this stage in the assessment does not 
defend their reasons to vote against a draft resolution which condemns the situa-
tion as a threat to international peace and security, therefor the decisions do not 
have legitimacy at this stage, but will be further exanimated in section 5.4.2. 
 
The second draft resolution in section 4.1.2 is the latest veto from the Security 
Council and draft resolution 172 itself was a result of the presented reports from 
the investigations done by the OPCW in Syria.304 The organisation had the man-
date and support from the Security Council to investigate the potential use of 
chemical weapons in Syria, hence the support was affirmed in resolution 2118 
(2013).305 The support and mandate to the OPCW will be further discussed in 
section 5.4.2; however, the conclusions form the OPCW presented evidence 
where chemical weapons have been used and therefor constitutes as a treat of 
international peace and security in accordance with resolution 2118 (2013). The 
permanent member build their veto argument based on that the reports from the 
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OPCW was not reliable conclusions due to the method for information gathering. 
As I will further argue in the next section 5.4.2, the reputation of the quality of 
work from the OPCW carries some weight for the presented reports on the use 
of chemical weapons. The principle of good faith is not only applicable for the 
member states, but also for the work of the OPCW. Both Russia, China and Syria 
are member states of the OPCW, hence all states are aware of the procedure and 
regulations for the organisation.306 It is in my opinion, that the mentioning of the 
term threat to international peace and security in combination, is enough for the 
permanent members to take a veto decision. The presented draft resolution would 
be a result of the adopted resolution 2118 (2013) and a response to the sever 
allegations on the use of chemical weapons. However, due to Russia has an out-
spoken promise of no Chapter VII measures towards Syria, it becomes more im-
portant in my opinion for a permanent member to present sufficient and legal 
arguments for the cause not to adopt a resolution.  
 
The draft resolution in section 4.1.3, referred to the recommendation by the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights for the Security Council to refer the situ-
ation of Syria to the ICC.307 The purpose of draft resolution 348 was for the pros-
ecutor of the ICC to investigate acclaimed violations of international and human-
itarian law, as well once more determining the situation as a threat to international 
peace and security. The permanent members who vetoed the draft resolution ar-
gued that to adopt such a resolution would inflame the political situation and that 
the information from the Caesar report is not confirmed. However, the purpose 
of the draft resolution was to initiate the investigation of crimes against interna-
tional law. Even though the recommendation is from the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, the permanent members brought forward valid arguments on 
why not to adopt the draft resolution. According to the Russian and Chinese del-
egation, the ICC itself is a problem, due to the practice set by other permanent 
members. The focus for draft resolution 348 is not as much on the purpose of 
international peace and security, it is more concerning the relationship with the 
ICC. One of the arguments is the reluctance from other permanent members, as 
well as other member states of the UN, reluctance to accede to the Rome Statute. 
If permanent members of the Security Council do not cooperate with the ICC, 
then why ought any other member state do it? Another argument is the previous 
referral to the ICC concerning the situation in Libya and how that solution did 
not bring any solution. However, the strongest argument in my opinion is the one 
reflecting on permanent member´s actions and relations with the ICC.  
 
Unfortunately, the previous does not build a strong argument for Russia and 
China to vote for the adoption of a resolution which other permanent members 
would probably not honour themselves. The arguments from the delegations are 
valid in the quest to protect international peace and security, and for finding a 
solution to the question of Syria. Even though the ICC was not brought in through 
this draft resolution, it is in my opinion that the Security Council should close the 
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door on the option to get the court involved when the conflict in Syria ends. The 
veto decisions do not challenge the purpose of international peace and security, 
although the political shield from Russia is still valid. Therefor the veto decisions 
have legitimacy and does not to be further assessed. 
 
Draft resolution 846 in section 4.1.4, was a response to the bombing in Aleppo 
and the evolvement of the situation in Syria concerning the deterioration of the 
devastating humanitarian situation and civilian casualties. The draft resolution 
reaffirmed once more that the continued situation in Syria still constitutes a threat 
to international peace and security. Compared to events, Russia was a part of the 
coalition with Syria for the bombings of Aleppo. Thus, Russia have intervened 
in the conflict and supported military actions. The standpoint for Russia and 
China in the Security Council have been towards finding a political solution, 
without any Chapter VII measures. However, Russian actions contradicts their 
own arguments in the Council for the solutions on the question of Syria. China 
abstained their vote for this draft resolution. The Russian delegation argued that 
the presented military suggestions in the draft was not thought trough, thus the 
possibility of a direct or indirect predetermined course of actions is a valid pos-
sibility. The question is if the participation of Russia in Syria effects their veto 
decision? One can only make assumptions and therefore must make the assess-
ment based on the presented arguments at the meeting. However, the Human 
Rights Watch condemned the actions as a possible war crime. The purpose of 
draft resolution 846 was to demand a ceasefire and stop all bombings over 
Aleppo, hence there are no determination of any Chapter VII measures. The con-
tinuing bombing is a threat to international peace and security, and Russia con-
tributes to the situation by provide military efforts. Thus, the outcome from the 
first indicator is in unclear whether the veto decision has legitimacy and must be 
further examined before determining legitimacy. 
 
When a draft resolution includes the determining of a threat to international peace 
and security, it is in my opinion that a permanent member needs to justify their 
veto decision even more than the present status quo. The next step is to assess 
whether the veto decisions in perspective to the international rules, principles and 
conventions. 
 
5.4.2 Respect for international conventions, customary rules and 
principles 
The Chinese delegation have maintained the path of political dialogues and solu-
tions as their stand point for every veto they have made concerning Syria. In their 
opinion the international principles protected by international law and the UN 
Charter are sufficient reasons. Even though the purpose of the Security Council 
is to maintain international peace and security, the actions from the Chinese del-
egation have been in a sense that the principles must be in grave danger to be 
violated for the Council to take measures under Chapter VII. Some of the vetoes 
have been argued that it was in the interest of political dialogues and the draft 
resolution would have a negative effect on the ongoing or future political and 
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diplomatic discussions. However, can the principles be considered as a grey zone 
for international law and be used when wanted or are the principles black and 
white as China portrays them, i.e. the principles are set in stone and has a one-
way interpretation? Furthermore, can the principles always be a legitimate argu-
ment? These questions will be discussed more in depth in relation to the draft 
resolutions. 
 
When examining the arguments concerning the draft resolution 616 in section 
4.1.1, 308 the principle of non-intervention is argued for strongly and regarding 
previous similar decision taken by the Security Council concerning Libya, is 
brought forward as an example. The arguments are collective and unified, thus 
presenting a good case on not to proceed with measures under Chapter VII. Due 
to the non-requirement for permanent members to present their arguments more 
precise concerning the right to veto, it is difficult to suggest whether the argu-
ments are sufficient for this stage in the assessment. However, the demand from 
Russia for the draft resolution to be more precise in how the resolution ought to 
be implemented is a relevant question before initiating Chapter VII measures. 
Maybe there is a need for draft resolutions to be more precise and include more 
details concerning implementation, than what the draft resolution 616 does. As 
for draft resolution 538 in section 4.1.2, the arguments focused more on what a 
Chapter VII would entail for the conflict in Syria and argued that it would erode 
international trust, as well as erode the cooperation on the issue of Syria. The 
permanent members anchor their argument that the resolution would work 
against the Special Envoy mission, thus undermining the work the Envoy has 
done. It is a valid point that a draft resolution with a Chapter VII character has 
the possibility to drastically change the political efforts done by different member 
states and mission, but how much patience can one have for a political settle-
ment? It is my opinion that the last stated argument is of a legitimate character to 
support the Special Envoy and give the work time. In perspective to the close 
dates between the presidential statements and the proposed draft resolution, there 
is not much room for the Envoy to carry out their work sufficiently. 
 
According to the reports from the OPCW presented in the draft resolution 172,309 
the use of chemical weapons constitutes a violation and therefor a threat to inter-
national peace, as well a violation of international law. When the OPCW pre-
sented their reports with supporting facts of a violation, the process of how this 
information was gathered and analysed was criticised by some of the permanent 
member states. The raised critic was vaguely presented by the permanent mem-
bers and maybe the main concern is not how the information for the OPCW re-
ports were gathered, maybe it is solely the fact that it would initiate measures 
under Chapter VII. But the question remains – towards whom shall the measures 
be taken? The question is a legitimate argument hence it must be further exam-
ined. Similar to the ICC draft resolution in the previous paragraph, this draft res-
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olution was a result from experts and their conclusions. The OPCW have pre-
sented their conclusions on the situation and identified responsible actors. Ac-
cording to resolution 2118 (2013) the OPCW had the approval and mandate of 
the Security Council to conduct special procedures in Syria.310 Although the issue 
of justification for measures was raised since findings from the OPCW might 
lead up to measures under Chapter VII. The concerned states said that the evi-
dence must be convincing to initiate such measures.  
 
One has the right to raise critical opinions concerning the reports presented by 
the OPCW, but at the same time one must consider what the organisation repre-
sents and their known quality of work. In addition, both Syria, Russia and China 
are member states of the OPCW and therefore are aware of the organisations 
work. Breaking down to the arguments for using the veto, it is in my opinion that 
the veto decisions against draft resolution 172 conflicts with the interest of inter-
national peace and security, as well that the decision lacks legitimacy in perspec-
tive to the arguments. In my opinion, the adopted draft resolutions are initiatives 
on finding and stating the fact; however, when a draft resolution presents the 
results some of the permanent members vetoes the draft resolution due to the 
unsatisfactory outcome. That a resolution of this character will have an impact is 
undeniable, but it is in my opinion that the arguments presented by the permanent 
members are more directed towards the organisation itself and that the path for 
solution is a political solution. The OPCW have concluded that there are viola-
tions of the use of chemical weapons, therefor the solution might not be a political 
solution for this situation. Therefore, the veto decisions undermine the draft res-
olution and the respect towards resolution 2118 (2013), as well the CWC. 
 
The draft resolution 846 in section 4.1.4, had the purpose of ending the bombings 
in Aleppo with a ceasefire, due to the humanitarian violation and the civilian 
casualties. Because of the involvement of Russia in the coalition with Syria, it is 
difficult to assess the veto decisions objectively. The standpoint for Russia, to-
gether with China, have been to follow the path of finding a sustainable political 
solution. Thus, the Russian actions contradicts this purpose. Even though these 
actions are controversial, the assessment must be done in accordance with the 
information provided at the meeting for the draft resolution.311 Russia argues that 
the draft text is unspecified on how it will predetermine the course of actions for 
the conflict. I agree that the any actions affecting the war, such as ceasefire, must 
be thought trough. However, the purpose of draft resolution 846 was to demand 
a stop all bombings over Aleppo and there is no determination of any Chapter 
VII measures. Thus, the draft resolution is a suggestion with actions towards in-
ternational peace and security. Even though the Russian arguments for a more 
detailed document with clear strategical purposes, the involvement of the state in 
the bombing makes the political reasons overshadow the legal arguments. The 
draft resolution reiterates the path of finding a sustainable political solution, with 
the implementation of Geneva Communiqué and resolutions 2254 (2015) and 
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2268 (2016). There are similarities to the mandate for the ISSG, but the draft text 
only repeats and affirms the need for a sustainable solution. Even though it is not 
clear from the draft text, the reference to the political solution could be seen as 
an indication of the support to the ISSG and not the purpose to recreate something 
new.  
 
A clear and precise text is always the best for a clear vision and path for the 
Security Council. Since the purpose of the draft is to start a ceasefire and reiterate 
the path for a political solution, the draft is for the purpose of international peace 
and security. Due to the involvement of Russia in the bombing of Aleppo, the 
legitimacy of their arguments becomes more difficult to determine. I would de-
termine this as a grey zone, where the arguments are for and against the veto 
decision, hence the opinions from the experts in the subsidiary organ would be-
come helpful. To initiate a ceasefire and military flights ban over Aleppo would 
be in the interest for the humanitarian violations and civilian casualties. To de-
termine that the presented ban and ceasefire in the draft resolution would be the 
wrong move, I need more knowledge on how to determine such a decision and 
its legitimacy. However, for the interest of international peace and security it is 
in my opinion that the veto undermines the purpose and work of the Security 
Council.  
 
5.4.3 Conclusions 
From one point of view, the veto can work negatively, in permitting powerful 
states, i.e. the permanent members, to kill resolutions with which they disagree, 
which means that it biases the council in the direction of inaction. One could say 
that the veto ensures that no collective action can be taken against the wishes of 
a permanent member, and therefor guarantees that the council will be paralysed 
at precisely those moments of greatest tension between the permanent mem-
bers.312 In reflection to the discussed veto decisions, it is not easy to determine 
their legitimacy. In section 1.7 the present research situation was discussed and 
in my conclusion, a legitimacy assessment of the veto decision has not been done 
before. Previous assessment has been performed concerning adopted resolutions 
from the UN; however, since the assessment for this thesis is different, the indi-
cators for legitimacy are different. The chosen indicators for the presented legit-
imacy assessment in this thesis could be described as broad and vague, but in my 
opinion they need to cast a bigger net due to that there is no requirement for 
permanent members to present their reasons for voting a veto. 
 
At the first stage of the legitimacy assessment, one of the vetoed passed the le-
gitimacy requirement. The arguments for the veto decisions for draft resolution 
348 were in my opinion legitimate, due to one of the permanent member states is 
not a party of the Rome Statute and the practice stated by other permanent mem-
bers of the Council, thus questioning the legitimacy of the ICC. If permanent 
members of the Security Council do not cooperate with the ICC, then why ought 
any other member state do it? The strongest argument in my opinion is the one 
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reflecting on permanent member´s actions and relations with the ICC. Even 
though arguments might lack the support of international principles and regula-
tions, the precedents of actions from previous situations and the practice from 
other permanent members are valued reasons. Thus, the veto decision has legiti-
macy due to the valid concerns of the ICC. 
 
Concerning the other assessed veto decisions, it is in my opinion that when a 
draft resolution determines a situation as a threat to international peace and secu-
rity, the permanent members needs to present their arguments for a veto in more 
detail, i.e. there is a responsibility of reasoning for the permanent members. In 
addition, independent CSO´s and the media have shown evidence of these viola-
tions through articles and reports.313 In my opinion, the principle of non-inter-
vention and principle of state sovereignty are the strongest principles against any 
Chapter VII actions. However, the suggested measures in the draft resolutions 
are not of military character, thus the references are to article 41 of the Charter 
and not article 42. The critic referred raised from the permanent members is that 
a potential adoption of a resolution with measures in accordance with article 41 
are the first step on the path towards military measures. In order to determine the 
legitimacy of the veto decisions, the first indicator is not enough for the remain-
ing veto decisions, as it only can determine the aspect of international peace and 
security and not if the veto decision against article 41 is legitimate. However, 
when examining the veto decision for draft resolution 846, a problematic factor 
was that Russia had been a part of the coalition with Syria at the time of the 
bombing of Aleppo. Thus, the permanent member who vetoed the draft resolu-
tion was a part of the situation the draft resolution aimed to react on. To determine 
the legitimacy of this veto decision, the second indicator is needed.  
 
The second stage of the legitimacy assessment, the veto decisions were discussed 
in the context of the international regulations brought forward in the draft reso-
lutions, as well as the legal arguments presented by the permanent members. As 
for draft resolution 616, the referral to previous actions form the Council in the 
Libyan conflict builds up a strong case for the veto decision. In combination with 
the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the veto has substantial 
legitimacy support. The arguments for draft resolution 538 were anchored on the 
support for the Special Envoy and that the draft resolution would undermine the 
work the Envoy. It is a valid point that a draft resolution with a Chapter VII 
character has the possibility to drastically change the political efforts done by 
different member states and mission. It is my opinion the argument is of a legiti-
mate character in order to support the Special Envoy and give the work time. In 
perspective to the close dates between the presidential statements and the pro-
posed draft resolution, there is not much room for the Envoy to carry out their 
work sufficiently. 
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Draft resolution 172,314 the use of chemical weapons constitutes a violation and 
therefor a threat to international peace, as well a violation of international law. 
As previously mentioned the raised critic was vaguely presented by the perma-
nent members. This draft resolution was a result from experts and their conclu-
sions and maybe the concern is more directed toward the possible Chapter VII 
measures, than the results from the report. According to the permanent members 
who vetoed the draft resolution was more concerned on keeping a political prom-
ise of no Chapter VII measures towards Syria; however, according to resolution 
2118 (2013) the OPCW had the approval and mandate of the Security Council to 
conduct special procedures in Syria.315 The concerned states said at the time that 
the evidence must be convincing to initiate such measures. One has the right to 
raise critical opinions concerning the reports presented by the OPCW, but one 
must at the same time consider what the organisation represents and their known 
quality of work. It is in my opinion that the veto decisions against draft resolution 
172 conflicts with the interest of international peace and security. The veto the 
decisions lacks legitimacy in perspective to the arguments, due to the vague ar-
guments of a political nature towards the OPCW. 
 
Finally, draft resolution 846. As previously mentioned the coalition with Russia 
and Syria makes the assessment of legitimacy more difficult. The Russian dele-
gation has a valid point concerning the ban and ceasefire in the draft text, hence 
it could be more precise regarding the possible predetermination of the course of 
actions. Even though, the delegation argued for the overlapping mandate of the 
ISSG with the mentioned political solution in the draft, it is in my opinion that 
reiterating a purpose for a sustainable political path in the draft, does not chal-
lenge the mandate of the ISSG. The purpose of the draft is to stop initiate a cease-
fire and hopefully continue with the political solution. Due to the political shield 
that Russia have towards Syria, in addition with the coalition, it is in my opinion 
that the political measures from Russia undermines the purpose of international 
peace and security. The arguments concerning the military flight ban and the un-
clear course of actions are valid arguments. In conclusion, this veto decision is 
in the grey zone and unclear whether it has legitimacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
314 See section 4.1.2. 
315 See section 4.2.2. 
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6 Concluding Remarks 
 
In this thesis, I have aimed to propose a legitimacy assessment of veto decisions 
concerning the question of Syria. The purpose of this assessment is to determine 
whether veto decisions can undermine the purpose of international peace and se-
curity. The assessment of the veto decisions has been a challenging task. How 
does one answer a question of this character without getting political? Hopefully 
this has been achieved, but as previously mentioned the research fields of inter-
national law and international relations are intertwined. Adding the discussion of 
legitimacy for the thesis have been a challenge. As Klabbers says – it is to add 
something slippery to the discussion. The flexibility of defining legitimacy have 
been a positive addition to the discussions, thus it fulfils the purpose of how one 
can examine what the law ought to be and what the present legal status quo is. 
Depending on how one approaches legitimacy, the outcome might differ. The 
same conclusion can be drawn when discussing the relationship between law and 
politics. Therefore, the two approaches, legitimacy and politics with law, be-
comes interesting dimensions to the discussion. 
 
The legitimacy of a forum was briefly discussed in section 3.1.2 and in my opin-
ion, the United Nations qualifies as an organisation which has political legitimacy 
in a normative sense, hence it has the power to rule, as well as the recognition 
and approval of its members. Upon becoming a member of the UN, a state agrees 
to the existing framework and rules. For example, one state cannot negotiate out 
of the UN Charter to become a member. A rule is considered legitimate if it com-
municates what is and what is not permitted. However, rules can be considered 
as norms that have been accepted through procedure and these procedures have 
been accepted by a whole community. If one put the article 50 of the Charter in 
the same equation, the article is a legitimate rule, thus it has been accepted by the 
UN community. The rules for the veto right are very brief in their description, as 
they focus on who has the veto right and on what matter it cannot be used. The 
practice of the veto rule has been accepted by the Security Council, but still crit-
icised when used by the permanent members of the Council. But is the veto right 
still in the interest of international peace and security? Mentioned in section 
5.3.2, the veto can be considered a safety net and still fulfil the purpose of the 
Security Council. Discussed in the legitimacy assessment of the veto decisions, 
a veto decision can conflict with international peace and security and the decision 
still be considered as legitimate. The determination of validity for the veto deci-
sions has been discussed throughout the legitimacy assessment and especially at 
the second stage of the assessment. When assessing veto decisions, the political 
language and purpose form the permanent members overshadows the legal lan-
guage, thus making an objective assessment challenging. The arguments con-
cerning the purpose of international peace and security sometimes disappears in 
the discussion of international primciples. 
 
There have been attempts in the draft resolutions to define the conflict in Syria 
as a threat to international peace and security, but this phrase has not been able 
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to win over the veto and become adopted. I have identified a pattern of which 
resolutions that have been adopted by the Security Council. All of them can be 
summarised in one word. Initiatives. The common theme on the resolution that 
have been adopted and its either initiation of mission, such as UNSMIS, or polit-
ical dialogues, for example Joint Special Envoy and ISSG. Thus, the adopted 
resolutions are the start of fact-finding missions and investigations with the pur-
pose to understand and gather information in order to make executive decisions. 
Resolutions have also been adopted with a humanitarian interest to support with 
aid for different situations, as well to support the initiative to political dialogues 
and find a solution from Syrian parties. However, when these initiatives or mis-
sions present their results and state that the situation is a threat to international 
peace and security, for example the OPCW and the bombing of Aleppo, the tone 
of the Security Council changes and the political arguments becomes more im-
portant than the legal reasons. In addition, the political shield by Russia for Syria 
creates not only a protection from Chapter VII for Syria, but also creates a limited 
path for the Security Council to act upon if Chapter VII resolutions will not be-
come adopted. Therefore, this kind of political action undermines the purpose of 
international peace and security. 
 
In reflection to the conclusion of the possibility for veto decisions to undermine 
international peace and security in chapter five, one of my research questions 
aimed to answer if the veto articles ought to be amended. In my opinion, the veto 
right article itself ought not to be amended; however, the veto right should have 
more added requirements. As have been argued on several occasions in the thesis, 
the non-existing requirement on presenting the reasons for a veto decision is a 
problem. This requirement in my opinion would increase transparency and the 
legal arguments for a veto decision. Therefore, the suggestion would be to either 
add new articles in the Charter and follow the procedures according to articles 
108 and 109, or the ILC could conduct a procedural document specifically focus-
ing on new requirements for the veto right, as well include the regulations for the 
new subsidiary organ. The procedural document would become the guiding doc-
ument for the subsidiary organ on how to conduct the assessment and outline the 
mandate for the organ. The new suggested articles would be written with the 
same purpose as the procedural document; however, it is in my opinion that a 
procedural document might be easier to implement instead of amending the UN 
Charter.  
 
The proposed legitimacy assessment is of course not unconventional, but this 
assessment is a proposition to start a discussion on how to change the legal status 
quo and if the veto right is still relevant. Some would argue that such assessment 
would undermine the procedural purpose of the Security Council. Nevertheless, 
it is difficult to present a conclusive solution for how the veto decisions ought to 
be assessed without becoming political in the discussion. After studying the dif-
ferent draft resolution, as well as the adopted resolution, the connection between 
law and politics become clearer, yet more confusing. Including the section on 
law and politics was necessary for the thesis, in order to understand the political 
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approach to law. The repetitiveness with the arguments and resolution texts can-
not be denied; however, one must remember that the conflict in Syria have been 
going on since 2011 and there is a will among the member states to solve the 
conflict. Furthermore, it is significant to reflect on the possibility that member 
states might have different opinions regarding the relationship on law and poli-
tics, depending on which of the reviewed approaches they agree with. There are 
differences of opinions among the permanent member for the sustainable solu-
tion on the question of Syria and which path to choose is yet to be determined. 
 
Undeniably, it is challenging to assess ongoing conflicts and how any decisions 
would directly or indirectly predetermine the course of action. Although there are 
difficulties to foresee an effect and assess retrospectively how the legitimacy as-
sessment could have been of value during the different veto discussion. Never-
theless, the question on vetoes legitimacy must be raised and even though the 
issue is difficult, it is not irrelevant. The approach of the legitimacy assessment 
challenges how veto decisions ought to be considered and why the veto decisions 
are to be assessed. The assessment itself is not exhaustive or complete, but it is a 
beginning of a discussion. Since the suggested assessment is regarding a perma-
nent member´s veto decision, the political factor becomes indirectly a part of the 
discussion. The present veto system ensures that no collective action can be taken 
against the wishes of a permanent member, thus the Security Council becomes 
unable act due to the disagreement of one permanent member. In reflection to the 
different approaches on how to define and understand the relationship with law 
and politics, the approaches indicate that there might be different assumptions by 
the member states on what the political function of the UN is. Therefore, the 
proposed legitimacy assessment reflects on the political arguments for a veto de-
cision overrules the legal argument and the purpose for the Security Council to 
maintain international peace and security. In perspective to the conflict in Syria, 
which becomes more severe every day it continues, the international community 
stands almost idly by because of the veto decisions. 
 
If a legitimacy assessment were to be adopted and implemented for the Security 
Council, it would be crucial that the aim is to increase the transparency of Council 
decisions and not to fulfil political motivations of the member states. It ought to 
be used as a safeguard for international peace and security. Conclusions from the 
legitimacy assessment indicates that some veto decisions are legitimate since the 
presented arguments are supported with international principles, one veto deci-
sion does not have legitimacy due the arguments presented by the permanent 
members are not sufficient compared to international peace and security and fi-
nally, one veto decision is in the grey zone due to the permanent member´s coa-
lition with Syria. The outcome of the assessment shows that the veto right is a 
topic which needs further research; however, it is my conclusion that the present 
veto right increase the political discussion and overshadows the legal arguments. 
Therefor there is an increasing risk for veto decisions to undermine international 
peace and security. 
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